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Most phosphorus loading to Lake Erie is now attributable to agricultural non-point sources; 
hence a better understanding of the factors that affect the ecosystem health is crucial. Decisions 
farmers make regarding the adoption of conservation practices are inherently dynamic, affected 
by changes in social, economic and environmental conditions, whereas the water quality models 
used to assess policy interventions lack this dynamic social component. To bridge this gap, this 
dissertation presents three necessary steps to evaluate the impacts of farmers’ adoption of 
conservation practices on water quality using a coupled natural and human systems modeling 
approach. The necessary steps are: 1) water quality modeling of the Sandusky watershed, Ohio 
using Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), 2) development of a farmer typology of 
conservation practice adoption among Corn Belt farmers and building an agent-based model 
(ABM) for adoption of conservation practices using the farmer typology, and 3) coupling the ABM 
with the water quality model to understand impacts of conservation practice adoption on water 
quality. In Chapter 2, SWAT is used for the Sandusky basin for 1970-2010 to simulate nutrient 
loading, particularly focusing on dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP).  The results indicate that 
recent increased storm events, interacting with changes in fertilizer application timing and rate, 
as well as management practices that increase soil stratification at the soil surface, appear to 
increase DRP runoff. In Chapter 3, the broad literature review on conservation practices adoption 
by Corn Belt farmers consistently identify four policy-relevant farmer characteristics, namely farm 




these characteristics, four broad farmer types emerged: traditional, supplementary, business-
oriented, and non-operator farmers. To study the dynamic social component of farmers on water 
quality, an ABM of conservation practice adoption by farmers using the farmer typology is built. 
In Chapter 4, the results of ABM are used as input for water quality models to explore the 
linkages between social and biophysical processes within this coupled system. This linked 
modeling framework highlights the importance of non-operator owners and the influence of crop 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
The progress of human societies has been highly dependent on agriculture, the expansion and 
intensification of which parallel the growth of the human population and its footprint.  However, 
the ecosystems upon which agriculture depends are constrained. According to the Food, 
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 2008, enhancing the quality of the environment and 
resource base is a key agricultural sustainability goal.  Therefore, to move toward sustainability, 
we must employ policies that provide benefits at different scales and preserve the integrity of 
existing resources. The adoption of conservation practices is regarded as an effective strategy to 
enhance water quality and improve agricultural sustainability by increasing system resilience 
(NRC, 2010).  The central objective of this dissertation is to contribute to agricultural 
sustainability by understanding and optimizing the relationships among water quality, agro-
environmental policy, and farmer adoption of conservation practices. This research examines the 
social-ecological system using a social model (Agent-based model, ABM) and a biophysically 
based watershed model (Soil and Water Assessment Tool, SWAT) to study farmer responses to 
agro-environmental policies of the United States, as well as the impacts of those responses on 
water quality.   
Agriculture is a major consideration in discussions of water resources sustainability as it can 
negatively affect water quality and quantity across a landscape wider than the agricultural 
production area.  In fact, nutrient pollution from agriculture is the leading cause of water quality 




of nutrient pollution - high river concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus - are correlated with 
inputs from application of fertilizers and manure from livestock wastes (Boyer et al., 2002; 
Galloway et al., 2004; Ribaudo and Smith, 2000).  
To mitigate the damage to ecosystem services, policies have focused on a range of solutions 
and institutions, including the development and implementation of conservation practices 
intended to alleviate negative impacts on water resources.  To study the effectiveness of these 
solutions, Veldkamp and Verburg (2004) highlighted the need for coupling models that 
incorporate dynamic feedbacks between social and biophysical systems. This research responds 
to that need by examining this coupled human and natural system using an agent-based model 
(ABM) and a biophysically based water quality model (SWAT) to investigate how farmer 
characteristics might interact with the combination of conservation practices to explain the effects 






Figure 1-1: Coupled human and natural system of farmers’ adoption of conservation practices and 
effects on water quality.  
 
The study area is an intensively cultivated watershed of Lake Erie, namely the Sandusky 
watershed in Ohio (Figure 1-2).  Lake Erie is the 11th-largest freshwater lake in the world and 
the southernmost, shallowest, warmest, and most biologically productive of the five Great Lakes 
(Myers et al., 2000).  Historically, Lake Erie has been subject to significant cultural 
eutrophication from excessive phosphorus loading, primarily from agricultural runoff and point 
source discharges (Dolan and McGunagle, 2005; Dolan and Chapra, 2012); however, non-point 




al., 2000; Dolan and McGunagle, 2005).  In response to concerns about the consequences of 
eutrophication, the governments of the US and Canada, largely through the support of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA, 1978), implemented a program of phosphorus load 
reduction that was unique worldwide (DePinto et al., 1986). The program led to a combination of 
point and nonpoint phosphorus load reductions that achieved the target load, prompting a 
response in the lake that was rapid, profound, and similar to that predicted by models 
(Makarewicz, 1993). Despite decades of a successful nutrient control program, serious symptoms 
of eutrophication persist in Lake Erie. Importantly, in recent years, unexpected increases in 
oxygen depletion and hypoxia have renewed policy attention on nutrient control. Hypoxia has 
severely impacted commercial and sport fisheries with cascading effects throughout the aquatic 
and coastal food webs (Carpenter et al., 2008). Because most phosphorus loading to Lake Erie 
now comes from agricultural non-point sources, causing hypoxia, it is important that we gain a 





Figure 1-2: Map of the geographic setting farmer types, showing the Corn Belt (dashed) and the 
Sandusky Watershed, Ohio.   
Chapter 2 focuses on building the water quality model of the Sandusky watershed in the Lake 
Erie basin using SWAT to simulate nutrient loadings, as indicators of water quality impacts 
(Figure 1-2). SWAT is an integrated hydrologic and biogeochemical water quality model that is 
particularly well suited for exploring the impacts of land management and conservation practices 
and for evaluating the effectiveness of policy alternatives (Arabi et al., 2007).   
The highly cultivated watersheds like the Sandusky, are major sources of non-point source 
pollution in Lake Erie (Hawley et al., 2006). As Lake Erie is a phosphorus limited aquatic 




build a process-based model of surface and groundwater hydrology, weather, sedimentation, soil 
temperature, crop growth, nutrients, and pesticides that can simulate the effects of climate and 
land use changes on nutrient and sediment delivery from watersheds. The primary objective is to 
understand potential factors contributing to the dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) increase in 
Lake Erie watersheds, especially in the Sandusky watershed in Ohio. The long term DRP trend 
change is particularly important in Lake Erie watersheds, as DRP is the form of phosphorus that 
is 100% bioavailable for plant growth and therefore influential on harmful algal bloom 
formation. In this study, the extensive observed water quality data set is obtained from 
Heidelberg University in Ohio and used for calibrating and validating the model.  With the 
advantage of the extensive observed data availability, the modeling period is 1974-2010, which 
is an exceptionally long simulation period in water quality modeling.  Results show that there are 
numerous factors causing the increase in the observed DRP loading and concentration after mid-
1990s, such as fertilizer application rates and timing, adoption of conservation practices and 
climate change. 
Chapter 2 indicates that land management decisions play a critical role in nutrient 
management from agricultural landscapes. These decisions that farmers make regarding the 
adoption of conservation practices are inherently dynamic, affected by changes in social, 
economic and environmental conditions, whereas the water quality models used to assess policy 
interventions lack the dynamic social component of farmers’ decisions. To represent the 
heterogeneity of farmers, Chapter 3 presents a classification of farmers into types according to 
policy-relevant farmer characteristics for use in agent-based models (ABM) that supports the 
development of targeted conservation policies aimed at reducing water-quality degradation. To 




their adoption by farmers in the Corn Belt region (Figure 1-2), with farmers defined as owners or 
renters of land on which cash crops such as corn, soybean and winter wheat are grown. This 
literature synthesis revealed that farm size, land tenure arrangements and source of income could 
be the policy-relevant farmer characteristics that influence farmers’ decision-making processes 
regarding conservation practices. By examining these policy-relevant farmer characteristics, four 
broad types of farmers emerged: (1) Traditional, (2) Supplementary, (3) Business-oriented, (4) 
Non-operator farmers. I operationalized these farmer types for use in ABMs, which tend to be 
most useful when constructed with the fewest characteristics (Axelrod, 1997). Farmer typologies 
have been developed for US farmers based on farm sales and operator occupations to understand 
the factors that influence decisions regarding conservation practices (Briggeman et al., 2007; 
Hoppe et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007). However, none of the US agricultural typologies serve 
as the basis for an ABM.   
In Chapter 3, I also use this typology to develop an ABM that can be used to examine 
alternative approaches to targeting conservation policy in Corn Belt agroecosystems. ABMs are 
computer-based models that can represent decentralized decision-making and interactions of 
heterogeneous social agents on multiple scales. The feature that distinguishes ABMs from other 
simulation techniques is that the former are constructed in a "bottom-up" manner by defining the 
model at the level of individual actors and their interactions with each other and with the 
environment.  The ABM generates agent behavior as agents use the already defined rules to 
determine which other agents to interact with, what to do when they interact, and how to interact 
with the environment. This flexibility allows the ABMs to be used to study systems on many 
scales, and to integrate the parts into a coherent whole.  Moreover, because the ABMs are 




models have previously been applied to agricultural systems (Happe et al., 2008), and have been 
shown to yield valuable information about responses to changes in policies governing complex 
systems like those in watersheds.   
The farmer typology formulated in Chapter 3 after a thorough review and synthesis of the 
literature on adoption of conservation practices by Corn Belt farmers is used to populate the 
agents in the ABM. This model investigates relationships between adopter and non-adopter 
farmers of conservation practices because ABMs can model individual agents with distinct 
decision-making patterns and behaviors. Farmer typology informs the ABM about how different 
factors such as available resources and knowledge of incentives and regulations mediate 
decisions about land use and applied conservation practices on rural properties. The ABM is 
designed to study the adoption behavior of the farmers and the results are used as input to the 
SWAT model to explore the effects of the adoption patterns on water quality. I employed this 
ABM under changing tenure dynamics and agricultural policies such as subsidized crop revenue 
insurance as proposed for the next Farm Bill, and found it to be a useful method to represent the 
dynamic social component in coupled social and biophysical process models. The outcomes of 
the ABM developed with these farmer types are used as input for water quality models to explore 
the linkages between social and biophysical processes within this coupled system. Moreover, the 
development of a farmer typology and subsequent construction of an ABM capable of 
representing the heterogeneity of US farmers in their adoption of conservation practices support 
the effective tailoring of agricultural policy to reduce sediment and nutrient runoff from 
agricultural land.  
In Chapter 4, I create coupled social-environmental models of agricultural watersheds with 




and their water quality impacts.  This requires the integration of analytical methods across the 
natural and social sciences, including water quality modeling and decision and policy analysis. 
For decision and policy analysis, I use the ABM developed in Chapter 3 and for estimating water 
quality impacts I use the SWAT model built in Chapter 2. In this study, farmers’ reactions to 
policies intended to affect adoption of conservation practices and their attitudes towards adoption 
are critical determinants of the spatial distribution of these practices, and therefore, to water 
quality outcome.  By understanding and modeling the interactions among adopters and non-
adopters and simultaneously analyzing the effects of these interactions on water quality, I build 
the knowledge necessary to evaluate the water quality results from alternative policies related to 
conservation investments.  This study constitutes an important step in understanding the effects 
of different policy approaches on the adoption of conservation practices and their impacts on 
downstream water quality.   By comparing different agro-environmental policies, I provide a 
timely assessment of the differences among and benefits of alternative policy options.  Further, 
by integrating this knowledge with the linked agent-based and watershed models, I provide a 
quantitative tool for evaluating alternative policy options.   
To summarize, this dissertation develops a farmer typology, constructs an ABM capable of 
representing the heterogeneity of US farmers in their adoption of conservation practices, and 
integrates farmer decisions into water quality models to support the effective tailoring of 
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Chapter 2: Evaluating causes of trends in long-term 
dissolved reactive phosphorus loads to Lake Erie 
Reproduced with permission from Daloğlu, I., K.H. Cho, D. Scavia. 2012. Evaluating causes 
of trends in long-term dissolved reactive phosphorus loads to Lake Erie. Environ. Sci. Technol. 
46:10660-10666 http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/es302315d. Copyright 2012 American Chemical 
Society. 
Abstract 
Renewed harmful algal blooms and hypoxia in Lake Erie have drawn significant attention to 
phosphorus loads, particularly increased dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) from highly 
agricultural watersheds.  We use the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to model DRP in 
the agriculture-dominated Sandusky watershed for 1970-2010 to explore potential reasons for the 
recent increased DRP load from Lake Erie watersheds.  We demonstrate that recent increased 
storm events, interacting with changes in fertilizer application timing and rate, as well as 
management practices that increase soil stratification and phosphorus accumulation at the soil 
surface, appear to drive the increasing DRP trend after the mid-1990s. This study is the first 









In the 1960s and 1970s, Lake Erie experienced significant cultural eutrophication from 
excessive phosphorus loading from both agricultural runoff and point source discharges (Dolan 
and McGunagle, 2005).  Responding to concerns about the consequences of eutrophication in the 
1970s, the governments of the US and Canada, largely through the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement implemented a program of phosphorus load reduction (International Joint 
Commission, 1978). The initial approach of reducing point-source loads alone was not adequate 
to achieve target loads set by the Agreement (Richards, 1985), so subsequently a combination of 
point and non-point phosphorus load reductions was used (Makarewicz, 1993). This combination 
of load reductions led to achieving the target load of 11,000 metric tonnes per year in most years 
with weather influencing year-to-year variability in non-point source loads. The response of the 
lake was rapid and profound with reduced algal biomass and reduction of low oxygen conditions 
in the central basin. With reductions in point source loads, in recent decades, non-point sources, 
particularly from agriculture, have become dominant sources of phosphorus (Forster et al., 
2000). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the main conservation policy goal for limiting non-point source 
pollution was to reduce sediment runoff and the phosphorus attached to sediments; therefore 
most conservation efforts focused on erosion reduction (Ohio EPA, 2010). These efforts, 
following implementation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, resulted in reductions in 
suspended solids and particulate phosphorus in Lake Erie tributaries, especially under low flow 
conditions compared to high flow conditions in spring (Richards, et al., 2009). However, despite 
decades of improvements in nutrient control, there have been unexpected recent increases in 




oxygen) in the hypolimnion of the central basin (Hawley et al., 2006). Because of their 
significant potential impact on food web interactions and fisheries (Vanderploeg et al., 2009), 
this has brought renewed policy attention on nutrient control.  
While the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (International Joint Commission, 1978)  
focused on total phosphorus (TP) as the water quality parameter by which Lake Erie 
eutrophication is to be managed, recent research indicates that dissolved reactive phosphorus 
(DRP) is of great importance because it is highly bioavailable (Richards, 2006; Valderploeg etal., 
2009). The National Center for Water Quality Research (NCWQR) at Heidelberg University has 
monitored stream flow and water quality daily from 1975 to the present revealing a perplexing 
trend in DRP loads, where this highly bioavailable form of phosphorus declined through the 
early 1990s, but then increased since the mid-1990s (Heidelberg University, 2012). This trend is 
observed in the agricultural tributaries of Lake Erie (Maumee and Sandusky) (Richards, 2006) 
and is particularly significant in the Sandusky watershed (Figures 2-1 and 2-2).  Moreover, the 
rate of oxygen depletion in the central Lake Erie basin is strongly correlated with DRP load since 
the mid-1990s (Rucinski et al., 2010).  It is important to note that, even though DRP load trends 
can be affected by trends in flow, similar trends are reported for DRP river concentration,  
indicating that changes in the loads of DRP are not solely a function of changes in hydrology 












Figure 2-2: Observed mean annual dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) load and concentration in the 
Sandusky River, OH (1974-2010) with a moving 4-year average trendline. 
Herein, we use the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to explore the role of several 
potential causes of the recent increases in DRP loading suggested by the Ohio P Task Force 
(Ohio EPA, 2010): 1) changes in fertilizer application rates; 2) widespread adoption of no-till 
and conservation tillage practices after the mid-1990s; 3) stratification of phosphorus (P) in the 
soil surface layer; and 4) changes in rainfall patterns.  We focus on the Sandusky watershed 
because it is representative of the other agriculturally dominated watersheds, has extensive 
(daily) flow and water quality data, and is small enough to allow SWAT to be applied at farm 
scale resolution. Our approach is to fully calibrate and evaluate the model to 40 years of 
observations and then explore the impact of hypothetical management and weather scenarios on 




1.1 Study Area 
The Sandusky watershed, located in northwest Ohio, is a 3926 km2 watershed (Figure 2-1) that 
drains into Lake Erie.  The dominant land use is agriculture (77%), where farmers specialize in 
corn, soybean, and winter wheat rotations, with minor livestock production.  Daily discharge as 
well as sediment, TP, and DRP loads are provided by NCWQR at Heidelberg University for the 
simulation time period (Heidelberg University, 2012).  
2. Methods  
SWAT is a continuous-time, integrated, watershed-scale hydrologic and water quality model 
that runs at a daily time-step (Gassman et al., 2007). It is a process-based model of weather, 
surface hydrology, sedimentation, soil temperature, crop growth, nutrients, pesticides, and 
groundwater that can simulate the effects of climate and agricultural management changes on 
nutrient and sediment delivery from watersheds (Arnold et al., 1998).  
SWAT is considered suitable for simulating long-term impacts of agricultural best management 
practices (BMPs) (Arabi et al., 2008) and land management measures on water, sediment, and 
agricultural nutrient loss from large, complex watersheds with varying soils, land use, and 
management measures (Arnold and Fohrer, 2005). SWAT simulates the transformation and 
movement of nitrogen and phosphorus in several organic and inorganic pools (Neitsch et al., 
2011),  where nutrient losses from soil occur through crop uptake, surface runoff, and eroded 
sediment (Jha et al., 2004).  
SWAT is a semi-distributed model with the hydrologic response unit (HRU), representing 
unique combinations of land cover, soil type, and slope, as the fundamental computational unit. 
Runoff flow, sediment, and nutrient loads are calculated separately for each HRU and summed to 




model at a spatial scale such that the average HRU size corresponds to the average farm size in 
the Sandusky basin (105 hectares) (USDA, 2009), resulting in 147 subbasins and 959 HRUs. 
Bosch et al. (2011) used SWAT to simulate tributary sediment and nutrient loading from six 
watersheds draining into Lake Erie, including the Sandusky, albeit at a much coarser physical 
scale and shorter time period. Their simulation period was 1998 to 2005, and thus not sufficient 
to capture the significant changes in DRP load, especially during the early and mid-1990s. So, 
we extended the modeling period to calibrate and evaluate the model with the extensive daily-
observed flow and water quality data from 1974 to 2010 for stream discharge and sediment, total 
phosphorus (TP), and DRP loads (Heidelberg University, 2012). 
We calibrated the model for 1991-2010 and evaluated it for 1974-1990, with 1970-1973 as 
spin-up years using daily flow discharge, sediment, TP, and DRP loads  We used the extensive 
empirical data of high quality (10918 data points for 1975 to 2010, i.e., on average 303 data 
points for each year for 36 years). We used the Sequential Uncertainty Fitting (SUFI2) method 
(Abbaspour et al., 2007), a stochastic procedure, and additional manual calibration to first 
calibrate for flow and then for sediment, TP, and DRP loads. Table 2-1 shows flow and DRP 
parameters with their ranges for the sensitivity analysis and calibrated values. Model 
performance (Tables 2-2 and 2-3) was considered satisfactory for use in this study based on the 
coefficient of determination (R2), Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency (NSE), and percent bias (PBIAS), 







Value Definition Flow DRP 
ESCO 0 1 1  0.99 Soil evaporation 
compensation factor 
REVAPMN 0 500 2  278.50 Threshold depth of 
water in the shallow 
aquifer for percolation 
to the deep aquifer 
(mm H2O) 
CN2 35 98 3  86.97 Initial SCS runoff 
curve number for 
moisture condition 
SMFMX 0 10 4  4.52 Melt factor for snow on 
June 21 (mm H2O/°C-
day) 
SOL_AWC 0 1 5  0.02 Available water 
capacity of the soil 
layer (mm H2O/mm 
soil) 
EPCO 0 1 6  0.12 Plant uptake 
compensation factor 
SOL_K 0 2000 7  571.33 Saturated hydraulic 
conductivity (mm/hr) 
SMTMP -5 5 8  2.37 Threshold temprerature 
for snowmelt (°C) 
GW_DELAY 0 500 9  204.83 Groundwater delay 
time (days) 
SFTMP -5 5 10  3.93 Snowfall temperature 
(°C) 
SMFMN 0 10 11  8.55 Melt factor for snow on 
December 21 (mm 
H2O/°C-day) 
CANMX 0 100 12  15.57 Maximum canopy 
storage (mm H2O) 
TIMP 0 1 13  0.60 Snow pack temperature 
lag factor 
CH_K2 -0.01 500 14  39.82 Effective hydraulic 
conductivity in main 
channel alluvium 
(mm/hr) 
SURLAG 0.05 24 15 4 10.44 Surface runoff lag 
coefficient 
CH_N2 -0.01 0.3 16  0.02 Manning's "n" value 
ALPHA_BF 0 1 17  0.98 Baseflow recession 
constant 





PSP 0.01 0.7  2 0.44 Phosphorus sorption 
coefficient 
P_UPDIS 0 100  3 20.00 Phosphorus uptake 
distribution parameter 
PPERCO 10 17.5  5 5.48 Phosphorus percolation 
coefficient 
Table 2-1: Sensitivity analysis results for flow and DRP parameters. 
 
 
             
    Observed 
mean (m3/s) 
   Simulated 
mean (m3/s)      R




Daily 34.8 31.2 0.55 0.54 9.79 
Monthly  35.8 31.9 0.74 0.72 10.96 




Daily 33.8 30.4 0.50 0.49 9.91 
Monthly  34.1 30.6 0.65 0.63 10.25 
Annual  33.9 30.6 0.74 0.59 9.67 
Table 2-2: Calibration and evaluation results for daily stream discharge (m3/s). Coefficient of 
determination (R2), Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency (NSE), and percent bias (PBIAS) are used to evaluate the model 
performance. Model simulations for flow are accepted as satisfactory if NSE>0.5 and PBIAS ± 25% (Moriasi 
et al., 2007). 
 





Sed 0.59 0.55 -7.42 
TP 0.62 0.55 -6.41 
DRP 0.71 0.62 -16.52 
OrgP 0.50 0.37 -4.42 
Evaluation 
(1974-1990) 
Sed 0.43 0.30 15.71 
TP 0.21 0.11 9.44 
DRP 0.32 0.30 -0.32 
OrgP 0.14 -0.04 11.23 
Table 2-3: Calibration and evaluation results for annual sediment loading (Sed, tons/year), total 
phosphorus (TP, kg/year), dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP, kg/year), organic phosphorus (OrgP, 
kg/year). Coefficient of determination (R2), Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency (NSE), and percent bias (PBIAS) are 
used to evaluate the model performance. Model simulations are accepted as satisfactory if NSE>0.5 and 




2.1 Baseline Scenario 
Our baseline scenario uses a realistic representation of trends in weather and agricultural 
landscape in the Sandusky watershed between 1970 and 2010. Agricultural operations for tillage 
practices, fertilizer inputs and application timing, and crop choices for the simulation period are 
generalized from the most common agricultural land management practices in the watershed.  In 
this region, cash-crop agriculture production with rotations of soybean, corn, and winter wheat is 
widespread. According to Richards et al. (2009), corn acreage in the Sandusky area has not 
changed significantly, while soybean acreage has increased and winter wheat acreage has 
decreased since the 1970s. For land cover types other than agriculture, such as residential, 
industrial, pasture, forest, and wetlands, we constructed operation schedules based on the most 
common management practices.  
Because fertilizer application is the largest input of both nitrogen and phosphorus in the 
agricultural watersheds of Lake Erie (Han et al., 2011), the amount of phosphorus application is 
a key management consideration, and these rates have changed over the simulation period in the 
Sandusky watershed (Ruddy et al., 2006).  In our baseline scenario, we used watershed-scale 
nutrient budgets constructed for the Lake Erie watersheds to represent temporal variation in 
application rates (Han et al., 2012). Trends in the Sandusky show higher fertilizer application 
rates in the 1970s, and after a reduction in the 1990s, an increase during the past decade.  
The baseline scenario also reflects changes in the long-term adoption rates of no-till and 
conservation tillage. Agricultural land under conservation tillage has at least 30% of crop residue 
from the previous year on the soil surface, and under no-till practices crops are planted with no 
soil disturbance in the crop residue of the previous year (Ohio EPA, 2010). These practices were 




al., 2000; Richards and Baker, 2002; Richards et al., 2009). This increase is due to the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement which promoted best management practices that reduce 
sediment runoff from agricultural fields (i.e., conservation tillage and no-till practices), that 
resulted in reductions in flow-adjusted concentrations of suspended solids and particulate 
phosphorus in Lake Erie tributaries (Richards, 2006; Richards et al., 2009). However, under no-
till practices, phosphorus can accumulate in the soil surface layer because crop residue and 
surface P are not mixed into the soil column (Beauchemin and Simard, 2000; Kleinman et al, 
2011; Sharpley, 2003). Moreover, no-till practices can increase soil stratification and 
accumulation of residual fertilizer P at the top of the soil profile and potentially intensify DRP 
runoff (Kleinman et al., 2011). In fact, widespread adoption of no-till and conservation tillage 
practices corresponds in time with the increased DRP loading after the mid-1990s.  In addition to 
no-till and conservation tillage practices (Kleinman et al., 2011), fertilizer application exceeding 
crop needs (Bennett et al., 2001) and  surface application (broadcasting) of P fertilizer and 
manure (Richards, 1985) have also lead to an increase in P accumulation in the soil surface layer 
and to a higher likelihood of P runoff from agricultural fields (Allen et al., 2006; Carpenter, 
2005). 
SWAT incorporates certain agricultural management practices such as tillage practices, 
fertilizer input and time of application, and a number of model parameters governing phosphorus 
generation and transformation in different P pools. After investigating the governing equations 
and mechanisms for P transformation and generation, both Radcliffe et al. (2009) and Vadas and 
White (2010) suggest that certain model parameters should be modified to reflect soil types and 
soil test phosphorus levels. For example, model parameters such as the P soil partitioning 




and organic P concentration (SOL_ORGP) in the surface soil layer should be determined by soil 
types and can be estimated using soil test phosphorus values and soil properties. Radcliffe et al. 
(2009) suggest that the P availability index (PSP) – rate of exchange between the inorganic labile 
P and active P pools in soils, should be spatially dynamic and calculated using the soil P 
concentration, clay content, and organic C content. Using the suggested methodology by 
Radcliffe et al. (2009), we calculated the area-weighted average of PSP for the entire Sandusky 
watershed for the simulation period.  
Based on our sensitivity analyses, PHOSKD is the most sensitive parameter for calibrating to 
DRP observations (Table 2-1). Because the standard version of SWAT is not capable of 
representing some of the mechanisms responsible for soil stratification and accumulation of P at 
the soil surface layer, we used the P soil partitioning coefficient (PHOSKD) - the ratio of the 
soluble phosphorus concentration in the soil surface layer to the concentration in surface runoff 
(Neitsch et al., 2011) - as a proxy representing the vulnerability of P to runoff from the soil 
surface layer. Increased adoption of no-till and conservation tillage after 1995, coupled with 
surface application of fertilizers, increased soil stratification and accumulation of P at the soil 
surface layer. Low values of PHOSKD allow more P runoff and therefore decreasing PHOSKD 
after the mid-1990s reflects this increased susceptibility of P runoff due to soil P stratification 
(Figure 2-3). 
Loss of DRP from watersheds is likely to be correlated strongly with storm events (Sharpley 
et al., 2008) and therefore weather patterns may have influenced trends in DRP runoff from 
agricultural land (Ohio EPA, 2010). Fertilizer application time, relative to weather patterns, 
therefore is another potential factor driving increased DRP yields. Traditionally, farmers apply 




such as lower fertilizer prices and labor and equipment availability motivate farmers for fall 
application (Ohio EPA, 2010). The runoff potential of nutrients, especially DRP, is higher in fall 
because the ground is bare and plant roots are not available or deep enough for nutrient uptake 
(Richards, 1985). However, because fertilizer sales are reported on an annual basis, there is no 
accurate method to determine month of application.  Therefore, for our baseline scenario we 
relied on previously conducted surveys with the farmers in the area (EPA, 2008; Napier and 
Bridges, 2002) and informal conversation with the extension agents to determine the percentage 
of spring vs. fall application over the 40 year simulation period. Within the dominant crop 
rotations, winter wheat always has fall fertilizer application. In early 1980s, corn farmers started 
broadcasting fertilizers in the fall after harvesting soybean. The transition to fall application 
started slowly but increased rapidly as farm size increased. Currently, many large farmers choose 
fall broadcasting; however, there appears to be a more recent trend back to spring application. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Time-dependent P soil partitioning coefficient, PHOSKD (m3/Mg) as a proxy to reflect the 






3.1 Baseline Scenario 
While we evaluated the model adequacy against daily, monthly, and annual measurements, we 
use 4-year running averages in our scenario analysis because we are more interested in exploring 
the long-term trends in DRP loads than in studying year-to-year fluctuations (Figure 2-4a). The 
baseline scenario has satisfactory model statistics for flow discharge, sediment, TP, and DRP 
loads (Tables 2-2 and 2-3) and is in accordance with the long-term DRP trends.  
3.2 Fertilizer Application Rate Scenario 
The baseline scenario includes a variable fertilizer application rate that decreases in the mid-
1980s and then increases in the early 2000s. To understand whether the pattern driving the DRP 
trend is due to changes in fertilizer application rates, we generated hypothetical scenarios that 
kept application rates at constant high (1970s) and low (mid-1990s) values (Figure 2-4b). From 
this analysis, it is clear that fertilizer input influences the magnitude of DRP load but does not 
appear to be the major factor responsible for the long-term DRP trend.  
3.3 Tillage Practices Scenario 
Our baseline scenario used documented historical adoption trends of conservation tillage and 
no-till practices.  We compared those results with two scenarios, one where all agricultural land 
was under no-till practices and another under conventional tillage. The simulation results 
indicate that agricultural land under no-till practices yield consistently more DRP compared to 
the baseline or conventional tillage scenarios (Figure 2-4c), and that the shift from conventional 
to no-till appears to contribute to the overall trend because the baseline simulation mimics the 




3.4 P Accumulation in the Soil Surface Layer  
To represent the accumulation of soil P in the soil surface layer in the baseline scenario, we 
varied the P soil partitioning coefficient (PHOSKD) after 1995 (Figure 2-3) to reflect the impact 
of adoption of no-till practices and surface application of fertilizers. To test the sensitivity of the 
model to that effect, we ran a scenario holding PHOSKD constant at the calibrated value equal to 
292 m3/Mg.  In this scenario, DRP load is lower through the early 2000s, unlike the baseline 
loads, suggesting that soil stratification and buildup at the soil surface layer is a significant driver 
in long-term DRP runoff (Figure 2-4d).   
 
 
Figure 2-4: Comparison of mean annual DRP (kg/year) load under the baseline scenario and (a) the 
observed DRP loads, hypothetical scenarios of (b) constant fertilizer application rate, (c) tillage practices, and 





3.6 Weather  
We evaluated precipitation patterns for the simulation period (1970-2010) to see if the 
frequency of extreme events in the study area changed during the spring and fall fertilizer 
seasons. We defined extreme events as events with precipitation magnitude above the 85th 
percentile for the period of record (1970-2009). The frequency of these extreme events during 
the first three decades was relatively stable in fall and increased in spring (Figure 2-5a).  It is also 
clear that the frequency increased more dramatically in both spring and fall fertilizer seasons in 
the last decade, shortening the fertilizer application window and perhaps increasing the potential 
for enhanced runoff. 
The baseline scenario incorporated daily rainfall, minimum and maximum air temperature, 
wind speed, relative humidity, and solar radiation for the simulation period (1970-2010). To 
explore the impact of weather trends, including storm intensity, on the long-term trend in DRP 
load, we ran two scenarios; one with randomized weather input and one with “reversed weather”.  
In both cases, we retained the within-year variability, but modified the orders in which the years 
were applied.  For the random weather case, we ran 10 simulations with weather years 
randomized; and show results for a representative simulation. For the “reversed weather” 
simulation, we switched 2010 weather with 1970, 2009 weather with 1971, etc.  
Randomizing weather produced the expected result of flattening the trend, (Figure 2-5b and 
data not shown) indicating that weather is an important factor in explaining the observed year-to-
year variation in DRP loading.  In addition, the “reversed weather” case revealed an interesting 
potential interaction effect with land-cover and land-management. While the reversed weather 
patterns did appear to produce somewhat higher loads in the 1970s and similar loads through the 




conditions on the land in the earlier decades, particularly in the 1970s when there was mostly 
conventional tillage and spring fertilizer application, made runoff less vulnerable to higher-
frequency storms that were employed in the “reversed weather” scenario.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: Frequency of extreme events (above 85th percentile) in the spring and fall fertilizer season 
where x-axis denotes decades and comparison of mean annual DRP (kg/year) load under the baseline 
scenario with observed weather pattern and the hypothetical scenario with reversed and random weather 
patterns. All trends are represented with a moving 4-year average trendline. 
4. Discussion 
The somewhat perplexing trend of increased DRP loading from the Sandusky watershed since 
the 1990s has attracted significant policy attention. To better understand the impacts of land 
management (i.e., fertilizer application management and adoption of no-till and conservation 
tillage,) and weather patterns on DRP loading, we compared realistic representations of the 




The baseline scenario, with the most representative agricultural operations for fertilizer inputs 
and application timing, tillage practices, and crop choices for the simulation period (1970-2010), 
matched the observed loads of sediment and various forms of P well. Our focus was on the long–
term DRP loading trend, and our baseline scenario captured the long-term trend well (Figure 2-
4a). 
To understand the impact of each potential driver of the long-term DRP load trend, we 
generated hypothetical scenarios. Keeping the fertilizer application rate constant at high 1970s 
and low mid-1990s values suggested that, while the input rate influences the magnitude of DRP 
runoff, it does not appear to be the major factor in shaping the long-term DRP trend. However, if 
application rates during the 40-year period were held at 15% lower than today’s rate, then 
today’s load of DRP would be 25% lower (Figure 2-4b).  
Similar to fertilizer inputs, changes in tillage practices influenced the magnitude of DRP runoff 
and appear to have had some influence on the overall temporal DRP pattern.  However, since the 
SWAT model does not include all of the impacts of no-till practices and surface application of 
fertilizers in the soil surface layer P accumulation and stratification, we modified the phosphorus 
soil partitioning coefficient (PHOSKD). This allowed us to better represent P accumulation in 
the soil surface layer due to adoption of no-till and conservation practices and broadcasting 
fertilizers in the baseline scenario. When PHOSKD values are kept constant, the trend in the load 
is lower through the early 2000s, but still increases after 2005, signaling the importance of other 
possible mechanisms, such as the impact of weather.   
Precipitation frequency and intensity influence the loss of nutrients following fertilizer 
application to agricultural fields. Applying fertilizer before storm events increases runoff, and 




(Smith et al., 2007).  Analyzing the precipitation data for the Sandusky watershed indicates that 
recent spring and fall fertilizer seasons have had more extreme events compared to previous 
decades. Similarly, analysis of Midwestern storm events indicate increased number of large 
storms in the last decade (Saunders et al., 2012).  Our hypothetical scenarios investigating the 
impact of weather on DRP loading by randomizing as well as reversing the precipitation record 
showed that the interaction of more storms with changes in agricultural practices adopted in the 
recent decades -- particularly in the mid-1990s (increase in no-till and broadcast fall fertilizer 
application) -- have likely led to the observed increase in DRP loads.  
While these analyses are important in evaluating the potential causes of long-term DRP loading 
changes from the highly cultivated agricultural watersheds of the Lake Erie, it is important to 
note that the SWAT model does not allow for the inclusion of other possibly important 
hydrological mechanisms such as the formation of ephemeral gullies. Moreover, when 
evaluating the impact of tillage systems on DRP runoff we need to note that rotational tillage, 
where the fields are tilled every other year instead of continuous no-till practices seem to be an 
increasingly common practice in the study area. More research is needed on the impacts of 
rotational tillage on DRP runoff.  Stratified soil P tests, detailed farmer surveys regarding 
fertilizer application times, and inclusion of more processes in SWAT to better represent soil 
stratification and P accumulation would lead to better informed modeling efforts.  For example, 
fertilizer application time was not included as a separate scenario in our analyses due to SWAT 
limitations. To evaluate the impact of fertilizer application timing, we would have to keep the 
fertilizer application date the same throughout the simulation period which could result in the 




the hypothetical fertilizer application date scenario would depend on the frequency of having a 
precipitation event on the randomly selected date, which would be biased. 
Evaluation of the scenarios demonstrated the importance of P stratification in soil surface layer 
and increased frequency of storm events observed in the last decade in the recent rise of DRP 
exported from western Lake Erie tributaries. Climate projections for the Midwest region indicate 
trends toward even more intense and frequent storms during the spring and winter seasons 
(Hayhoe et al., 2010).  Therefore, attention to actions that remediate nutrient, especially DRP, 
runoff from the agricultural landscape during such storms is needed. 
Our model results emphasize the need to focus on agricultural practices and their impact on 
water quality. For instance, broadcasting fertilizer on bare ground in fall results in 
unincorporated nutrient accumulation that is vulnerable to runoff until spring. Moreover, 
according to Kleinman et al. (2011), broadcasting P fertilizer onto no-till or conservation tillage 
fields results in higher DRP runoff. Therefore, to reduce P accumulation in the soil surface layer, 
incorporation of fertilizer especially under no-till practices is highly encouraged. As promoted by 
the fertilizer industry and the USDA under the Nutrient Stewardship program (IFA, 2009), 
adjustments in agricultural management practices to achieve the right rate, time, and place of 











Abbaspour, K.C., Yang, J., Maximov, I., Siber, R., Bogner, K., Mieleitner, J., Zobrist, J., 
Srinivasan, R., 2007. Modelling hydrology and water quality in the pre-ailpine/alpine 
Thur watershed using SWAT. J Hydrol 333, 413-430. 
Allen, B.L., Mallarino, A.P., Klatt, J.G., Baker, J.L., Camara, M., 2006. Soil and surface runoff 
phosphorus relationships for five typical USA Midwest soils. J Environ Qual 35, 599-
610. 
Arabi, M., Frankenberger, J.R., Enge, B.A., Arnold, J.G., 2008. Representation of agricultural 
conservation practices with SWAT. Hydrol Process 22, 3042-3055. 
Arnold, J.G., Fohrer, N., 2005. SWAT2000: current capabilities and research opportunities in 
applied watershed modelling. Hydrol Process 19, 563-572. 
Arnold, J.G., Srinivasan, R., Muttiah, R.S., Williams, J.R., 1998. Large area hydrologic 
modeling and assessment - Part 1: Model development. J Am Water Resour As 34, 73-
89. 
Beauchemin, S., Simard, R.R., 2000. Phosphorus status of intensively cropped soils of the St. 
Lawrence lowlands. Soil Sci Soc Am J 64, 659-670. 
Bennett, E.M., Carpenter, S.R., Caraco, N.F., 2001. Human impact on erodable phosphorus and 
eutrophication: A global perspective. Bioscience 51, 227-234. 
Bertram, P.E., 1993. Total Phosphorus and Dissolved-Oxygen Trends in the Central Basin of 
Lake Erie, 1970-1991. J Great Lakes Res 19, 224-236. 
Bosch, N.S., Allan, J.D., Dolan, D.M., Han, H., Richards, R.P., 2011. Application of the Soil and 
Water Assessment Tool for six watersheds of Lake Erie: Model parameterization and 
calibration. J Great Lakes Res 37, 263-271. 
Carpenter, S.R., 2005. Eutrophication of aquatic ecosystems: Bistability and soil phosphorus. P 
Natl Acad Sci USA 102, 10002-10005. 
DiToro, D.M., Thomas, N.A., Herdendorf, C.E., Winfield, R.P., Connolly, J.P., 1987. A Post 
Audit of a Lake Erie Eutrophication Model. J Great Lakes Res 13, 801-825. 
Dolan, D.M., McGunagle, K.P., 2005. Lake Erie total phosphorus loading analysis and update: 
1996-2002. J Great Lakes Res 31, 11-22. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2008. Status of nutrients in the Lake Erie basin. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
Forster, D.L., Richards, R.P., Baker, D.B., Blue, E.N., 2000. EPIC modeling of the effects of 
farming practice changes on water quality in two Lake Erie watersheds. J Soil Water 
Conserv 55, 85-90. 
Gassman, P.W., Reyes, M.R., Green, C.H., Arnold, J.G., 2007. The soil and water assessment 
tool: Historical development, applications, and future research directions. T Asabe 50, 
1211-1250. 
Han, H., Allan, J.D., Bosch, N.S., 2012. Historical pattern of phosphorus loading to Lake Erie 




Han, H., Bosch, N., Allan, J.D., 2011. Spatial and temporal variation in phosphorus budgets for 
24 watersheds in the Lake Erie and Lake Michigan basins. Biogeochemistry 102, 45-58. 
Hawley, N., Johengen, T.H., Rao, Y.R., Ruberg, S.A., Beletsky, D., Ludsin, S.A., Eadie, B.J., 
Schwab, D.J., Croley, T.E., Brandt, S.B., 2006. Lake Erie hypoxia prompts Canada-U.S. 
study. Eos Trans. AGU 87. 
Hayhoe, K., VanDorn, J., Croley, T., Schlegal, N., Wuebbles, D., 2010. Regional climate change 
projections for Chicago and the US Great Lakes. J Great Lakes Res 36, 7-21. 
Heidelberg University, N.C.f.W.Q.R., 2012. Sandusky River water quality data. 
International fertilizer Association (IFA), 2009. The Global “4R” Nutrient Stewardship 
Framework: Developing Fertilizer Best Management Practices for Delivering Economic, 
Social and Environmental Benefits, Paris, France. 
International Joint Commission (IJC), 1978. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978 
Agreement with Annexes and Terms of Reference, Between the United States of America 
and Canada. International Joint Commission, Windsor, Ontario. 
Jha, M., Gassman, P.W., Secchi, S., Gu, R., Arnold, J., 2004. Effect of watershed subdivision on 
swat flow, sediment, and nutrient predictions. J Am Water Resour As 40, 811-825. 
Kleinman, P.J.A., Sharpley, A.N., McDowell, R.W., Flaten, D.N., Buda, A.R., Tao, L., 
Bergstrom, L., Zhu, Q., 2011. Managing agricultural phosphorus for water quality 
protection: principles for progress. Plant Soil 349, 169-182. 
Makarewicz, J.C., 1993. Phytoplankton Biomass and Species Composition in Lake Erie, 1970 to 
1987. J Great Lakes Res 19, 258-274. 
Moriasi, D.N., Arnold, J.G., Van Liew, M.W., Bingner, R.L., Harmel, R.D., Veith, T.L., 2007. 
Model evaluation guidelines for systematic quantification of accuracy in watershed 
simulations. Transactions of the Asabe 50, 885-900. 
Napier, T.L., Bridges, T., 2002. Adoption of conservation production systems in two Ohio 
watersheds: A comparative study. J Soil Water Conserv 57, 229-235. 
Neitsch, S.L., Arnold, J.G., Kiniry, J.R., Williams, J.R, 2011. Soil and Water Assessment Tool 
(SWAT) Theoretical Documentation. 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2010. Ohio Lake Erie Phosphorus Task Force 
Final Report 2010, Colombus, OH. 
Radcliffe, D.E., Lin, Z., Risse, L.M., Romeis, J.J., Jackson, C.R., 2009. Modeling Phosphorus in 
the Lake Allatoona Watershed Using SWAT: I. Developing Phosphorus Parameter 
Values. J Environ Qual 38, 111-120. 
Richards, R.P., 1985. Estimating the Extent of Reduction Needed to Statistically Demonstrate 
Reduced Non-Point Phosphorus Loading to Lake Erie. J Great Lakes Res 11, 110-116. 
Richards, R.P., 2006. Trends in sediment and nutrients in major Lake Erie tributaries, 1975–
2004. Lake Erie Lakewide Management Plan 2006 Update, p. 22. 
Richards, R.P., Baker, D.B., 2002. Trends in Water Quality in LEASEQ Rivers and Streams 




Richards, R.P., Baker, D.B., Crumrine, J.P., 2009. Improved water quality in Ohio tributaries to 
Lake Erie: A consequence of conservation practices. J Soil Water Conserv 64, 200-211. 
Rucinski, D.K., Beletsky, D., DePinto, J.V., Schwab, D.J., Scavia, D., 2010. A simple 1-
dimensional, climate based dissolved oxygen model for the central basin of Lake Erie. J 
Great Lakes Res 36, 465-476. 
Ruddy, B.C.L., D.L.; Mueller, D.K., 2006. County-level estimates of nutrient inputs to the land 
surface of the conterminous United States, 1982-2001, in: (USGS), U.S.G.S. (Ed.). 
USGS, Reston, Virginia. 
Saunders, S.F., Dan; Easley, Tom; Spencer, Theo, 2012. Doubled trouble More Midwestern 
extreme storms. 
Sharpley, A.N., 2003. Soil mixing to decrease surface stratification of phosphorus in manured 
soils. J Environ Qual 32, 1375-1384. 
Sharpley, A.N., Kleinman, P.J.A., Heathwaite, A.L., Gburek, W.J., Folmar, G.J., Schmidt, J.R., 
2008. Phosphorus loss from an agricultural watershed as a function of storm size. J 
Environ Qual 37, 362-368. 
Smith, D.R., Warnemuende, E.A., Huang, C., Heathman, G.C., 2007. How does the first year 
tilling a long-term no-tillage field impact soluble nutrient losses in runoff? Soil Till Res 
95, 11-18. 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2009. 2007 Census of Agriculture Volume 1, 
Part 51, Geographic area series. United States summary and state data. 
Vadas, P.A., White, M.J., 2010. Validating Soil Phosphorus Routines in the Swat Model. 
Transaction of the Asabe 53, 1469-1476. 
Vanderploeg, H.A., Ludsin, S.A., Ruberg, S.A., Hook, T.O., Pothoven, S.A., Brandt, S.B., Lang, 
G.A., Liebig, J.R., Cavaletto, J.F., 2009. Hypoxia affects spatial distributions and overlap 






Chapter 3: Adoption of conservation practices: An agent-
based modeling typology of farmer characteristics 
 In review: Daloğlu, I., Nassauer, J.I., Riolo, R.L., Scavia, D. Adoption of conservation 
practices: An agent-based modeling typology of farmer characteristics. Agricultural Systems 
 
Abstract  
Farmers’ decisions about adopting conservation practices are inherently dynamic, affected by 
changes in environmental, economic, and social conditions, including interactions with other 
farmers.  Water quality models used to assess agricultural policy interventions, such as the Soil 
and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT), lack the dynamic social component of farmer’s decisions. 
While agent-based models (ABM) can represent and explore these decision dynamics, there are 
only a few studies that link ABMs to water quality models that can simulate environmental 
outcomes of farmer decisions. Linking ABMs and SWAT could advance the development of 
targeted conservation policies. Toward this aim, we developed a typology of Corn Belt farmers 
based on characteristics relevant to their land management decisions applicable in SWAT. Then, 
based on this typology we developed an ABM to better understand the emergent land 
management decisions of the farmers.  To identify these characteristics, we reviewed the 
literature on farmer adoption of conservation practices and found land tenure arrangements, farm 
size, source of income, and information networks were most consistently identified as 




characteristics, we identified four types of farmers to populate the ABM that will be linked to 
SWAT:  (1) “Traditional”: farmers with small operations relying primarily on on-farm income; 
(2) “Supplementary”: farmers with small operations relying primarily on off-farm income; (3) 
“Business-oriented”:  farmers with larger operations relying primarily on on-farm income and 
well connected to information networks; (4) “Non-operator”: absentee or investor farmland 
owners with limited connections to local information networks. We used this typology to 
develop a conceptual framework for an ABM that can be used to examine alternative approaches 
to targeting conservation policy in Corn Belt agroecosystems. We employed this ABM under 
changing tenure dynamics and agricultural policies such as subsidized crop insurance as 
proposed for the next Farm Bill, and found it to be a useful method to represent the dynamic 
social component in coupled social and biophysical process models.   





Agriculture continues to be a major contributor to water pollution, soil degradation, climate 
change, and biodiversity loss. The highly cultivated watersheds of the Corn Belt are major 
sources of non-point source pollution (Nassauer et al. 2007; National Research Council 2010; 
Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force 2008). Agricultural runoff is 
often the cause of algal blooms, poor water clarity, and summer hypoxia (low oxygen) in the 
Gulf of Mexico (Ribaudo and Johansson 2006), Lake Erie (Hawley et al. 2006), and elsewhere 
(Committee on Environment and Natural Resources 2010). Hypoxia has severely impacted 
commercial and sport fisheries, with trophic cascades affecting aquatic and coastal food webs 
(Carpenter et al. 2008). 
Federal policy strongly affects the management choices of American farmers and thus the 
landscape characteristics and water quality of farms and downstream ecosystems.  Farmers are 
defined in this analysis as owners or renters of farmland where cash crops are grown. The US 
Farm Bill, which is renewed approximately every five years, is the federal policy that most 
directly affects agricultural land use and practice. Since the 1930s, the Farm Bill has included 
specific soil and water conservation programs, as well as support for production of certain crops 
(Nassauer and Kling 2007). Yet, Farm Bill support for crop production has substantially and 
consistently outweighed incentives for conservation (Doering et al. 2007).   
Recent changes proposed for the Farm Bill include replacement of direct payments for crop 
production with subsidized crop insurance that acts as an income safety net that may affect 
management decisions, especially for risk-averse farmers. Currently, farmers can choose 
between two insurance policies, crop yield and revenue insurance, and USDA provides 




Crop yield insurance protects farmers from income effects of reduction in agricultural yield due 
to weather and other factors, whereas revenue insurance protects farmers’ income from both 
market fluctuations and yield changes.   
Developing more effective agricultural policies necessitates a better understanding of the 
motivations and underlying socio-economic circumstances of farmers (National Research 
Council 2010).  However, these attributes are not homogenous or static among farmers 
responding to conservation policies.  
The relationship between farmers’ decisions about adoption of conservation practices and 
water quality outcomes is part of a complex coupled human and natural system and, as such, 
coupled social-biophysical models can be valuable tools for better targeting federal investments 
(Jackson-Smith et al. 2010).  Such approaches can incorporate farmer decisions in exploring 
whether or not substantial changes in water quality can be expected as a result of specific policy 
interventions. Knowledge of the socio-economic factors that influence farmers’ conservation-
related decisions is essential for the construction of such a model.  
Typologies have been suggested (Kostrowicki 1977; Duvernoy 2000; Valbuena et al. 2008) 
as a means to effectively represent the heterogeneity of farmers’ motivations and socio-economic 
circumstances related to conservation behavior. This is particularly relevant because typologies 
are key components of agent-based models (ABMs), computational methods that model 
decentralized decision-making in a given heterogeneous system to predict emergent 
characteristics.  Implementation of a farmer typology in an ABM can demonstrate the impacts of 
changing land tenure dynamics and proposed risk management programs in US agricultural 
policy on adoption of conservation practices. This paper describes the basis for a farmer 




Assessment Tool (SWAT), a river basin scale water quality model, developed and maintained by 
the US Department of Agriculture to assess the water quality benefits of conservation practices 
(Gassman et al. 2007; Osmond 2010).  We used this ABM to compare how different land tenure 
dynamics and policy interventions may affect spatial patterns of adoption of conservation 
practices, and ultimately use it in the linked model to compare their impacts on downstream 
water quality (Figure 3-1).  
 
Figure 3-1: Using a farmer typology in a coupled human and natural system of farmers’ adoption of 
conservation practices and effects on water quality.  We constructed our farmer typology using farmer 
characteristics relevant to adoption of conservation practices that are applicable in SWAT models and we 
implemented this typology in an ABM.  
 
1.1. Geographic Setting of Farmer Types 
Our study site, the Sandusky Watershed, Ohio drains into Lake Erie (Figure 3-2), and is 
typical of the Corn Belt, which occupies portions of the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota.  Consequently, we developed a 
policy-relevant farmer typology by reviewing and synthesizing the literature on the adoption of 




Belt are major sources of non-point source pollution in Lake Erie (Hawley et al. 2006), as well as 
the Mississippi River and its tributaries (Ribaudo and Johansson, 2006).  
Farmers specialize in cash-crop (corn, soybean) production, with livestock production less 
common (USDA 2009).  In the Sandusky Watershed, like much of the Corn Belt, most farmers 
rent at least some of the land they farm, and about half declare their primary occupation to be 
non-farming (Table 3-1). While most farms in the Corn Belt and the Sandusky Watershed are 
small (less than 180 acres), large farms (more than 500 acres) make up a much larger proportion 
of the total area harvested and large-scale, commercial farms dominate the landscape (Figure 3-
3). 
 
Figure 3-2: Map of the geographic setting of farmer types, showing the Corn Belt (dashed) and the 





Figure 3-3: Distribution of farm size in the Corn Belt and the Sandusky watershed (OH) by number of 
farms and harvested land. Source: USDA (2009) 
 
  Corn Belt Sandusky, OH 
 
farms acres farms acres 
Full owner 50.9% 16.6% 
  
50.4% 14.8% 
  Part owner 39.9% 72.4% owned  43.0% 43.0% 77.0% owned 35.6% 
   
rented 63.9% 
  
 rented 60.6% 
Tenant 9.2% 8.8% 
  
8.6% 8.7% 
  Primary occupation                  
Farming  47.9% 44.6% 
Other 52.1% 55.4% 
Male 89.2% 95.3% 
  
91.4% 96.5% 
  Female 10.8% 4.7% 
 




worked days off, any 63.70% 65.6% 
>200 days 36.30% 34.4% 
Used conservation 
practices  34.10% 46.3% 





1.2. Farmer Characteristics  
Among the many factors that influence farmers’ decisions regarding conservation practices, 
we focus on farmer characteristics most immediately relevant to conservation practices affecting 
water quality and applicable in SWAT. Many empirical studies have been conducted to describe 
the relationship between the adoption of conservation practices and farmer-specific variables 
such as age, education, land tenure, and farm size. Some emphasize attitudes and motivations 
(Lynne et al. 1988; Ryan et al. 2003), and some emphasize other social, economic and structural 
variables (Nowak 1983; Tosakana et al. 2010; Napier et al. 2000; Napier and Bridges 2002; 
Lemke et al. 2010). Unfortunately, no one variable has been identified as universally influencing 
the diffusion and adoption of conservation practices. Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) reviewed 
empirical studies from around the world in an attempt to identify such a universal variable; 
however, they were unable to do so due to differences in geography, relevant agricultural 
policies and statistical methods employed by the different studies reviewed. Similarly, after 
reviewing 55 US studies on the adoption of best management practices, Prokopy et al. (2008) 
conclude that there is no single factor that consistently affects decisions. Although a number of 
studies have found farm income to be an important consideration, that alone cannot explain the 
adoption decisions of a farmer under every circumstance (Chouinard et al. 2008). Camboni and 
Napier (1993) conclude that adoption decisions are generally more influenced by structural 
variables such as farm size, income source, farm specialty, debt-to-asset ratio and participation in 
government programs than by personal variables such as environmental problem awareness, 
farming experience and education.  
For a typology to be used in an ABM, which requires simplicity to explore dynamic 




farmer characteristics that would be relevant to the conservation practices intended to affect 
water quality.  As such, we eliminated variables such as education, age, attitudes/motivations, 
environmental awareness, and farming experience that generally have been found to be less 
relevant to these practices.   
2. Methods 
2.1. Agent-based Models 
ABMs are computer-based models that can be used to represent decentralized decision-
making and interactions of heterogeneous social agents on multiple scales. ABMs consist of one 
or more types of agents (e.g., different types of farmers), as well as an environment in which 
these agents are embedded. The models are useful for running computational experiments to 
assist in reasoning about systems that are inherently dynamic and uncertain (Bankes 1993). That 
is, ABMs are not prescriptive, and their purpose is not to predict the system outcome, but rather 
to identify relationships among agents and particular variables as well as how these relationships 
affect system behavior. Because ABMs are computational models, they are formal, 
unambiguous, and thus, replicable and testable (Miller and Page 2007).  They are powerful tools 
for modeling coupled human and natural systems (Liu et al. 2007; An 2011).   
Agent definitions can include various characteristics, preferences, memories of recent events 
and social connections, abilities to carry out particular behaviors, decision-making rules, 
heuristics, and other mechanisms to generate individual agent responses to inputs from other 
agents and from the environment. ABMs can also include social networks of various kinds that 
define interaction topologies based on group memberships, business contacts and common 




demonstrate the dynamics of agent behavior, as agents use rules to determine which other agents 
to interact with, how to interact with them, and how to interact with the environment.  
The ‘bottom-up’ nature of ABMs– defining the model at the level of individual decision 
makers (agents) and their interactions with each other and with the environment – differentiates 
them from other simulation techniques (Gilbert 2008). Because ABMs can capture spatial 
interactions among agents, they can reflect robustly the diffusion of information in social 
networks (Baerenklau 2005; Happe et al. 2008; Kaufman et al. 2009) making them especially 
well-suited to model how heterogeneous farmer characteristics affect spatial patterns of adoption 
decisions.  
An ABM is most informative when it is comprised of a small number of variables that allow 
for better transparency and a deeper level of understanding (Axelrod 1997). Therefore, we aimed 
for parsimony in developing the farmer typology to be linked with SWAT.  
2.2. Typology Studies  
Building a typology based on empirical literature can present potential limitations if they are 
oversimplified in an ABM. In that case model implications may be more theoretical than policy-
relevant (Valbuena et al. 2008).  In his seminal study, Kostrowicki (1977) argues that the 
variables selected for the construction of typologies are more important than the classification 
technique applied. Valbuena et al. (2008) highlight the importance of choosing variables that 
reflect the socio-economic situation and context of decision makers.  
To test the effects of policy-relevant characteristics of farmer decisions, the typology 
developed should be focused on bringing insight to responses to policy. Because farmer 
typologies have often been tested using survey data from a specific locality (e.g., Kraft et al. 




limitation, we sought a simple, synthetic set of policy-relevant farmer characteristics to be 
employed in a more generally applicable ABM.  
Farmer typologies developed in the Netherlands (Valbuena et al. 2008), Chile (Carmona et 
al. 2010), Greece (Daskalopolou and Petrou 2005) Argentina (Duvernoy 2000), and Australia 
(Bohnet et al. 2011), as well as the United States (Hoppe et al. 2007; Briggeman et al. 2007; 
Lambert et al. 2007) have been useful when program managers and policy makers have been 
able to differentiate between landowners with different land-management motivations and 
management capacities that influence their behavior (Emtage et al. 2007).  The geographic scale 
of such studies varies from continental (Andersen et al. 2006; Terluin et al. 2010) to national and 
regional. For example, Hoppe et al. (2007) categorized US farmers based on farm sales and 
operator occupations, using the results of the Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS) administered by the National Agricultural Statistical Services (NASS) to understand the 
factors that influence decisions regarding conservation practices. Lambert et al. (2007) used this 
same typology in another national study employing random utility regressions to examine which 
farmer characteristics promote the adoption of conservation practices; they found that farmers 
are heterogeneous in their response to conservation policy depending on their characteristics. 
Another example of a national farmer typology is a characterization of US farm households 
based on household economic theory (Briggeman et al. 2007). Typologies developed to 
characterize farmers within a region include Kraft et al. (1989), who constructed a typology to 
study southern Illinois farmers’ goals and views on soil conservation. However, none of the 
typologies constructed for US farmers have been developed for use as the basis for an ABM.   
Farmers are diverse in their structural characteristics related to conservation decisions. This 




economic rationality, has been suggested as the reason for errors in conventional farm-level 
models of US agricultural policy (Nowak 1987; Nowak and Cabot 2004). As Happe et al. (2008) 
point out, failure to consider farmer diversity and interaction among farmers in designing 
agricultural policies often leads to program failure. ABMs can fill this gap by demonstrating the 
effects of diversity and interactions.  
3. Results and Discussion 
We identified four policy-relevant farmer characteristics that are consistent throughout the 
literature related to conservation decisions of Corn Belt farmers: land tenure arrangements, farm 
size, income source, and information networks.  Because we used this typology to populate an 
ABM that will be linked to SWAT, the capabilities of SWAT were decisive in constructing the 
parsimonious typology.  Therefore, we categorized these conservation practices in three broad, 
SWAT-applicable categories: “non-structural”, “structural”, and “land retirement” practices 
(Table 3-2).  
Conservation 
Practice Categories  
Conservation 
Practices 
Economic and Environmental 
Benefits 
Non-structural Conservation tillage, no-till 
Reduces soil erosion from both water 
and wind, increases organic matter 
and enhances water quality. Reduces 






Enhances water quality by trapping 
soil particles, nutrients and pesticides; 
improves water infiltration; enhances 








Plants long-term, resource-conserving 
covers. Reduces soil erosion from 
highly erodible lands (HEL), restores 
wetlands. Enhances water quality and 
wildlife. 




3.1. Land Tenure Arrangements  
Tenure arrangements indicate the extent of ownership and control of farmland, which can 
directly affect adoption of conservation practices. In this analysis we have three land tenure 
arrangements for defining farmer types: full owner, part owner, and non-operator owner (Table 
3-3).With full ownership, the farmer owns all of the land in operation, whereas part owners own 
only a portion of the operated land with the remainder rented from others.  ‘Non-operator 
owners’ rent out all of the land and do not operate any farmland themselves.  Non-operator 
owners may include both ‘absentee landowners’, individuals who live outside the county where 
they own farmland but who may be or have been involved in farming (Petrzelka et al. 2009), as 
well as ‘investors’, non-operator owners who describe themselves as never having farmed and 
who may not necessarily live outside the county where they own farmland (Nassauer et al., 
2011).   
Farmer types 
Policy-relevant  













Farm Size Small Small Medium to Large N/A 
Primary Source of 











Table 3-3: Farmer types constructed by using policy-relevant farmer characteristics. 
In general, US agriculture has undergone a steady decline in full ownership and a rise in part 
and non-operator ownership (Wunderlich 1993; Duffy 2008).  This rapidly growing proportion 




ARMS database reflects how this phenomenon has affected the Corn Belt, as represented by the 
Sandusky Watershed (Table 3-1).  There, only 14.8% of the total farmland acreage is owned by 
full owners, compared to 27.4% owned by part owners, 46.7% rented by part owners, and 8.7% 
rented by tenants who rent all the land they farm and own no farmland.  In other words, more 
than half of the land farmed in the Sandusky watershed is owned by someone other than the 
operator.  While it is possible that some of those owners are farmers who simply choose not to 
operate some of their land, it is reasonable to assume that non-operators own land rented by 
others.  
Most empirical research concludes that operators control decisions regarding production and 
adoption of conservation practices on farmland owned by non-operators (Constance et al. 1996; 
Soule et al. 2000; Arbuckle 2010). However, with growing proportions of farmland owned by 
non-operators, current policy and future expectations that Corn Belt farmers generally own the 
land they farm may change as well, and non-operators may have more influence on decisions.  
While conventional wisdom suggests that owner-operated land is better preserved and 
managed because renters generally have no long-term stake in the environmental quality and 
sustainability of the land they rent, actual experience is mixed (Prokopy et al. 2008; Petrzelka et 
al. 2009; Nassauer et al. 2011; Fuglie 1999; Bultena and Hoiberg 1983). Soule et al. (2000) 
suggest that the relationship between tenure arrangements and adoption of conservation practices 
varies with the type of practice in question. For example, renters are more likely to adopt 
practices that are profitable in the short term, such as non-structural practices, whereas owners 
are more likely to adopt practices that have long-term implications and require capital 
investment, such as installing structural practices, which include filter strips and grassed 




Recently, studies have highlighted the need to study the growth of subgroups of non-operator 
owners, like absentee landowners and investors. Absentee landowners generally have not been 
involved in land management decisions, deferring to their renters (Duffy 2008; Petrzelka et al. 
2011; Petrzelka et al. 2012, Petrzelka et al. 2009; Soule et al. 2008; Wells and Eells 2011). On 
the other hand, in a study of 549 Iowa farmers (Nassauer et al., 2011), 54.5% of investors 
(farmland owners who described themselves as never having farmed) stated that they made daily 
decisions regarding farm operations.  Compared with operators, investors were notably more 
likely to adopt certain structural and non-structural practices that enhance environmental quality. 
The study concluded that investors’ limited experience with management requirements of some 
conservation practices could explain their positive attitudes toward these practices. Petrzelka et 
al. (2011) found that those absentee landowners who did participate in land management 
decisions favored adopting conservation practices more than their renters. 
A review of the literature reveals that enrollment in land retirement programs is less 
prevalent among absentee landowners than operator landowners. Petrzelka et al. (2009) report 
that absentee landowners lag operator landowners by 64% in land retirement program enrollment 
in the Great Lakes Basin. In contrast, Nassauer et al. (2011) found investors to have higher land 
retirement program enrollment rates compared with active farmers across Iowa. While non-
operator owners presently tend to leave production and conservation decisions to their renters, 
who tend to make decisions that support short-term profitability, our ABM simulates a 





3.2. Size of Farm (owned and rented land)  
Farm size, or acres of harvested cropland, varies across the US (see, for example, Hoppe et 
al. 2007), and has been one of the most-explored variables in adoption studies (Rahm and 
Huffman 1984; Nowak 1987; Belknap and Saupe 1988; Caswell et al. 2001; Napier et al. 2000). 
For example, Hoppe et al. (2007) reveal that large-scale farms with annual sales of $250,000 or 
more accounted for only 10 percent of US farms but 75 percent of production value in 2004. 
Farm size reflects both economic and social aspects of farming, and operators of small and large 
farms respond differently to policy and market changes (Prokopy et al. 2008). Therefore, we 
identified operators of small farms as a distinct category (Table 3-3). After reviewing 55 studies 
conducted in the US, Prokopy et al. (2008) conclude that farm size is positively correlated with 
the adoption of conservation practices more often than it is negatively correlated (i.e. Belknap 
and Saupe 1988; Caswell et al. 2001; Bultena and Hoiberg 1983; Gould et al. 1989; Soule et al. 
2000; Napier et al. 2000). In general, operators of larger farms are assumed to be more willing to 
invest in new technologies and adopt conservation practices, because the overall benefits of 
adoption increase for large farms (Knowler and Bradshaw 2007).  However, the relationship 
between farm size and adoption of conservation practices may vary with the particular 
conservation practice employed (Table 3-2).  
Data collected from 371 farmers in east Ohio show that the area farmed influences farmers’ 
decisions to adopt conservation tillage, filter strips, and grassed waterways (Camboni and Napier 
1993). Lee and Steward (1983) conclude that small farm size may impede adoption of non-
structural practices such as conservation tillage and no-till practices, and Fuglie (1999) suggests 
that operators of larger farms are more likely to adopt no-till practices. Based on the 2001 USDA 




unaffected by production scale, but that production scale as well as implementation costs become 
significant when farmers need to invest in more costly structural practices.  
The influence of farm size on the adoption of conservation practices can be explained in a 
number of ways. For example, operators of large farms may adopt structural practices such as 
filter strips and grassed waterways because they have the ability to spread installation or 
equipment costs over a large area, lowering the per-acre cost of adopting new technologies and 
conservation practices (Lambert et al. 2007). The risks of adopting new technologies and 
conservation practices also can be spread with larger farms (Lichtenberg 2004). However, land 
retirement programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Wetland Reserve 
Program (WRP) have been adopted at higher rates among small farmers (Lambert et al. 2007) 
because these programs reduce farmers’ labor and time requirements. In general small farms are 
more likely to have full owners, whereas large farms are more likely to be partly owned or fully 
rented. Our ABM simulations reflect this notion by allowing farmers to have varying farm sizes. 
In the model, through time, as farmers age, they either sell their land to other farmers or become 
non-operators by renting their land to others, reflecting the increasing percentage of large scale 
farms and non-operators as time progresses (Section 3.6). 
3.3. Source of Income  
Farmer income affects most decisions, including those regarding conservation practices 
because the adoption of which can require financial investment and can reduce short-term 
profitability (Caswell et al. 2001). To understand the role of income generated from farm and 
off-farm sources, source of income is generally categorized by measuring off-farm employment 
in terms of number of days the primary farm operator works off the farm for wages or a salary 




(Nowak 1987; Loftus and Kraft 2003), and primary occupation of farm operators (Petrzelka et al. 
2009). Our typology characterizes farmer types by on-farm and off-farm income because these 
categories may relate to conservation adoption decisions (Table 3-3).   
A significant proportion of Corn Belt farmers have income from off-farm sources, which 
may be used to stabilize and/or increase household income (Napier and Camboni 1993; Loftus 
and Kraft 2003; Briggeman et al. 2007). According to an econometric model built by Mishra and 
Goodwin (1997) and validated with survey results from 300 Kansas farmers, off-farm income is 
positively correlated with lowered risk and variability for farmer incomes. For this reason, off-
farm income sources are appealing to risk-averse farmers. A study by Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 
(2007) shows that in 2004, more than half of US farm operators worked off the farm and more 
than 80% of total farm household income was earned from off-farm sources. Similarly, the US 
Agricultural Census for 2007 shows that 55.4% of farmers in the Sandusky Watershed had a 
primary occupation other than farming (Table 1). Dependence on off-farm income differs with 
the size of the managed farmland. While small farm households receive a significant portion of 
their income from off-farm sources (Hoppe et al. 2007), large farm households tend to be more 
dependent on farm income (Nehring et al. 2005). Households with greater dependence on farm 
income may feel pressure to maximize short-term profits from their land (Caswell et al. 2001; 
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 2007).  
Debt-to-asset ratio, the degree of financial leverage used in farmland operations, also affects 
motives to maximize profits as it affects farmers’ risk aversion. A number of studies have argued 
that high debt-to-asset ratios will increase risk aversion and prevent farmers from investing in 
conservation practices (Belknap and Saupe 1988; Ervin and Ervin 1982). Certain studies also 




(Fuglie 1999; Nowak 1987; Loftus and Kraft 2003). This suggests that farmers with greater off-
farm income have greater financial flexibility and stability. Both farmers who depend on farm-
generated income (Napier et al. 2000) and farmers who have supplementary income (Gould et al. 
1989) have been found to adopt non-structural conservation practices (Table 3-2). However, 
based on interviews with more than 1,000 farmers in Ohio, Iowa and Minnesota, Napier et al. 
(2000) find that farmers with higher reported gross income from farm sources have higher rates 
of adoption of structural conservation practices. Farmers with higher off-farm income have 
higher enrollment rates in land retirement programs such as the CRP and WRP, perhaps because 
they have limited time available for farming (Hoppe et al. 2007). In general, off-farm income 
provides financial flexibility to smaller farms, whereas larger farms whose operators may rely 
primarily on farm income may feel they have less flexibility to choose practices that reduce 
short-term profits.  
In our ABM simulations, source of income and risk management are important variables. In 
the model, farmers fall into different farmer types depending on the percentage of on-farm 
income and adopt different conservation practices under changing agricultural policies. For 
example, farmers that have off-farm income are assigned a higher tendency to enroll in land-
retirement programs (Section 3.6). 
Proposed changes in the US Farm Bill to promote crop insurance would have significant 
impacts on farmers’ risk management and consequently on their adoption decisions. Risk 
management programs such as substantially increased premium subsidies for crop insurance tend 
to encourage production and stabilize farm-generated income. Previous research indicates higher 
adoption rates for risky conservation practices when crop insurance is purchased (Bosch and 




risky in terms of their possible yield reduction; therefore with the safety net provided by crop 
insurance, farmers would be incentivized to adopt practices that they perceive could reduce yield 
(Bosch and Pease, 2000).  Because crop insurance is based on production area, we would expect 
farmers to be discouraged from adopting structural practices which reduce the insurable 
production area.  In fact, Goodwin and Smith (2003) raise concerns about possible decrease in 
CRP enrollment with the revenue protection provided by crop insurance because it may promote 
production. Numerous studies indicate increased nutrient management and application of less 
fertilizer with enrollment in crop insurance (Goodwin and Smith, 2003, Babcock and Hennessy, 
1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Sheriff, 2005).  
In our ABM, we simulate hypothetical future scenarios in which farmers buy subsidized crop 
insurance. However, heterogeneity among farmer types becomes less relevant with a crop 
insurance program because it motivates farmers to increase production area regardless of their 
type. In our ABM simulations, farmers are assumed to have revenue crop insurance at the 75% 
coverage level and make conservation decisions considering their future expectations for crop 
yields and prices, and these expectations change by farmer type (see Section 3.6 and Appendix 
A).  
3.4. Information Networks  
Studies of the adoption of conservation practices have long recognized information as 
influential. Information channels include media, observation of other farmers’ fields and 
practices, and communication with other farmers and extension agents (Rahm and Huffman 
1984; Belknap and Saupe 1988; Lemke et al. 2010). Access to various information networks is a 
crucial variable in our typology because ABMs can effectively explore the dynamics of 




Information is crucial when decisions are made about conservation practices because the 
adoption of conservation practices is a complex process that requires trial and evaluation.  In 
addition to extant knowledge, personal contacts influence the adoption process and significant 
relevant information and experience flows through networks (Nowak 1987; Lemke et al. 2010). 
Farmers need information that will allow them to estimate the costs and benefits of available 
alternatives. One reason for non-adoption of a new technology is uncertainty about the outcomes 
of adoption. Autant-Bernard et al. (2007) suggest that networks of adopters and non-adopters or 
potential adopters are the foremost mechanisms for reducing this uncertainty, and that frequent 
contact among adopters and non-adopters deepen relationships and promote information 
exchange. They suggest that geography is crucial in the diffusion process, providing an 
environment for the transmission of knowledge, experience, and technology.  
In agriculture, the physical proximity of adopters is considered to affect the decision-making 
process (Hagerstrand 1967), and the ‘neighborhood effect’ has been studied extensively 
(Baerenklau 2005; Case 1992). Farmers are known to update their decision-making strategies by 
using their prior experience and by observing what their neighbors have done (Saltiel et al. 
1994). As Rogers (2003) states, direct observation of what others have done is very important in 
adoption decisions and can provide potential adopters with persuasive information about the 
nature of conservation practices and their potential outcomes. Imitation of neighbors’ practices 
can be understood as a strategy to compensate for lack of knowledge (Belknap and Saupe 1988). 
In addition to spatial proximity and neighborhood observation, other information networks 
provide channels through which farmers can obtain information on conservation practices and 
new technologies. For example, Loftus and Kraft (2003) found that farmers who paid frequent 




on filter strips and had higher rates of adoption of this practice. Similarly, Tucker and Napier 
(2002) discovered that farmers who had greater access to information networks and education 
programs were more aware of the non-economic benefits of conservation practices and had 
higher adoption rates. In addition, Prokopy et al. (2008) showed that access to social networks is 
one of the most influential variables influencing adoption. They also found that not all farmers 
are exposed to information at the same level. In other words, there is a variation in the level of 
network ‘connectedness’ among farmers, which ultimately affects the patterns of conservation 
practice adoption in a given locale. Similarly, Petrzelka et al. (2009) showed that financial 
constraints did not significantly affect decision-making for absentee landowners in the Great 
Lakes Basin, but that lack of communication and information networks did. 
Social ties to the renter also lead to greater participation in decision-making by non-operator 
landowners. Stronger social ties are indicated by more continuous rental years, longer periods of 
having known the renter, and longer lease lengths. Moreover, previous research has shown that 
as the spatial distance between the landowner and the renter increases, the frequency of 
communication decreases (Arbuckle, 2010). Petrzelka et al. (2011) point out that renters 
communicate differently with absentee landowners than with non-operators that live within the 
county. Namely, absentee landowners are not as connected as local farmers to information 
networks, which may hinder the ability of absentee landowners to access information, including 
information on conservation practices. Similarly, when explaining the gap between high interest 
in conservation practice but low participation, Petrzelka et al. (2009) suggest lack of 
communication between absentee landowners and natural resource agencies as well. Since the 




the potential impacts of land tenure change and non-operators’ network connectedness on 
management decision and consequently on the landscape. 
In our ABM simulations, we define two types of information networks, spatial and social. 
The spatial network is based on the immediate geographic connections, whereas the social 
network represents social ties that a farmer may have (see Appendix A).  While non-operators 
currently have lower network connectedness, our ABM simulates a hypothetical future scenario 
in which both absentee landowners and investors have higher network connectedness (Section 
3.6). This is based on the assumption that the natural resource agencies will reach out more to the 
non-operators and provide information about existing practice and policies. In these hypothetical 
scenarios, investors who could live in the county where they own farmland are more connected 
to both the spatial and social networks that consists of both other farmers and natural resource 
agencies, whereas absentee landowners who tend to not live in the same county where they own 
farmland are only connected to the social networks of natural resource agencies. Because 
network connectedness is influential on adoption decisions, this difference affects how investors 
and absentee owners make management decisions 
3.5. Farmer Typology  
Using the farmer characteristics described above, we constructed a simple mutually exclusive 
four-part typology for our ABM (Table 3-3): 
3.5.1. Traditional Farmers  
Farmers of this type are full owners of small farms (less than 180 acres or 73 hectares), 
operating only the land they own.  Farming is their primary occupation, and they depend 




significant amount of time working on the farm (Briggeman et al. 2007). They are attentive to 
financial concerns, but they also value preserving their rural lifestyle (Kraft et al. 1989). 
In general, smaller farms are associated with lower farm income. Therefore, traditional 
farmers require a longer time period to pay off conservation investments (Caswell et al. 2001), 
and this could discourage adoption of practices that require a high initial investment and a 
relatively longer pay-off period. Consequently, structural conservation practices such as grassed 
waterways and filter strips may have lower adoption rates among traditional farmers. However, 
traditional farmers have the highest enrollment rates in land retirement programs such as CRP 
and WRP (Hoppe et al. 2007). Both the secure income and low labor requirements of land 
retirement programs may make them attractive to traditional farmers, who  also favor non-
structural practices such as conservation tillage that reduce overall labor requirements (Hoppe et 
al. 2007, Napier 2009).    
3.5.2. Supplementary Farmers  
Supplementary farmers have small farms (less than 180 acres) and substantial off-farm 
income. They may be retired or part-time farmers whose off-farm income sources may include 
part-time or full-time jobs. These farmers do not depend solely on earnings generated from 
farming activities, and this substantially affects their management and conservation decisions. In 
addition, unlike traditional farmers, supplementary farmers may rent or own the farmland they 
operate, although most own all the land they farm.  
Supplementary farmers favor adopting non-structural practices such as conservation and no-
till, because these practices are less costly and less labor intensive (Gould et al. 1989; Fernandez-
Cordejo et al. 2007). As they earn most household income from off-farm sources, supplementary 




cultivated for example filter strips (Loftus and Kraft, 2003; Lynch et al. 2002). Supplementary 
farmers also have high enrollment rates in land retirement programs such as CRP and WRP 
(Hoppe et al. 2007) that are not labor intensive and provide a secure income source.  
3.5.3. Business-oriented Farmers  
Business-oriented farmers operate at least 180 acres and most likely rent at least part of the 
land they farm. They are highly dependent upon farm income since farming is their primary 
occupation (Hoppe et al. 2007). Fernandez-Cordejo et al. (2007) found an inverse relationship 
between off-farm income and farm size measured with gross annual sales, showing operators 
with large operations to be less dependent on off-farm income sources. Business-oriented 
farmers are also less dependent upon conservation payments, but more dependent upon 
commodity-related federal programs such as agricultural disaster payments and direct payments 
(Hoppe et al. 2007; USDA, 2011). 
Because business-oriented farmers focus more on farm yield and profitability, they tend to 
concentrate on high-value cash grains and hence adopt management intensive conservation 
practices that increase short-term returns from production. Compared with other types of 
farmers, business-oriented farmers are more likely to adopt conservation tillage and, because of 
their focus on farm production they are also more likely to adopt structural practices (grassed 
waterways, filter strips) (Bultena and Hoiberg 1983; Lambert et al. 2007). Considering that they 
are more motivated by short-term profits than traditional and supplementary farmers, business-
oriented farmers’ decisions about whether to enroll land in the CRP and WRP may be limited by 




3.5.4. Non-operator Owners  
Non-operators are owners of the land, but they are not the primary day-to-day decision 
makers regarding production and management. Non-operator owners include absentee 
landowners and investors. Absentee landowners own the agricultural property but do not reside 
on or operate it, they tend to live in urban areas, away from their farmland (Petrzelka et al. 2011), 
whereas investors describe themselves as never having farmed, but may live on or near their 
farmland (Nassauer et al. 2011). Petrzelka et al. (2009) find that nearly half of the owners of 
farmland in the Great Lakes Basin do not operate the land that they own. They also show that 
603 absentee landowners in the survey sample owned relatively small farms (100-285 acres). In 
a survey sample of 549 Iowa farmers, Nassauer et al. (2011) observed that Iowa farmland 
investors owned farms similar in area to those of other farmers. Petrzelka et al. (2009) also state 
that less than half of the household income of absentee landowners in the Great Lakes Basin was 
generated from farmland, and Constance et al. (1996) show that absentee landowners tend to 
depend less on farm income than local non-operator landowners. 
As absentee landowners live out of the county, and investors describe themselves as never 
having farmed, both groups may be less connected to local information networks and less aware 
of environmental problems and government programs, compared with operator landowners. 
Therefore, Petrzelka et al. (2009) found that absentee landowners lag behind operator 
landowners in adoption of land retirement programs (CRP and WRP).  However, Nassauer et al. 
(2011) found that Iowa farm investors reported higher CRP and WRP enrollment rates than other 
Iowa farmers. Owners may be more likely to adopt structural practices because these practices 
require capital investment (Soule et al. 2000; Caswell et al. 2001). Nassauer et al. (2011) note 




practices and Pertzelka et al. (2009) underline the positive attitudes of absentee landowners to 
certain conservation practices and their benefits, 
3.6. ABM Results 
We used the above farmer typology to populate ABM agents to investigate the impacts of 
changing land tenure dynamics and agricultural policy such as subsidized crop insurance as a 
risk management program on farmers’ conservation decisions. To apportion the farmer 
attributes, such as farm size, land tenure, and source of income, we used county scale NASS 
survey data and national agricultural census data collected every 5 years by USDA. However 
because these data are not available to the public at a scale representing individual farms, the 
ABM represents farms as cells on a two-dimensional grid in a stylized model. The model is run 
with annual steps for 40 years (1970-2010). Model details are explained in Appendix A using the 
ODD protocol (Grimm et al., 2006; Grimm et al., 2010).   
Our farmer typology represents the heterogeneity of farmers in the region. To better represent 
the socio-economic condition during the simulation period, we embedded key temporal trends in 
the model, such as the decline in full ownership of small production areas and an increase in 
large production areas and non-operator ownership (Wunderlich 1993; Duffy 2008). We first 
tested the model against documented socio-economic trends observed in the region such as 
increasing average age of farmers (Figure 3-4A) (USDA 2009). Because the model is applied to 
investigate the impact of changing land tenure dynamics, we used it to confirm the model 
findings on growing number of non-operators (absentee and investors) (Figure 3-4B) who may 
make conservation decisions differently (Wunderlich 1993; Duffy 2008; Petrzelka et al. 2009; 






Figure 3-4: (A) Average age distribution for farmer agents indicates that farmer population is aging.        
(B) Percentage of non-operators (absentee landowners and investors) is increasing for the simulation period 
(1970-2010). 25 ABM simulation runs fall between two lines of the same color.  
Percentage of business-oriented and supplementary farmers increase, while traditional 




example, after age 65 some of the traditional farmers leave farming and become non-operator 
owners by renting their land to business-oriented or supplementary farmers or they sell their 
land. Over time during the simulations, this results in an increase in business-oriented and 
supplementary farmers and a concomitant decrease in small traditional farmers (Figure 3-5).  It 
also demonstrates the rapidly growing proportion of the non-operators (Figure 3-4B). 
 
Figure 3-5: Proportion of farmer types during the simulation period (1970-2010). Percentage of small 
traditional farmers decreases, whereas large business-oriented farmers and small supplementary farmers 
increase.  25 ABM simulation runs fall between two lines of the same color. 
Farmer population becomes more connected mostly due to increasing business-oriented 
farmers: Connectedness to the information network is another dynamic component of our model. 
In our farmer typology, different farmer types have varying connectedness to information 




compared to traditional and supplementary farmers. Non-operator owners are initially not 
connected to the spatial and social networks because they do not live in the county in which they 
own land, or they do not have a farming background. In the scenario when non-operators are 
involved in decision-making, investors are connected to the spatial network, but with a smaller 
number of connections when compared to the operator types. In addition, we assume that non-
operators are connected to natural resource agencies if they are decision makers. As the 
percentage of business-oriented farmers and non-operators increases with time, the social 
network structure also changes. Increasing percentage of business-oriented farmers that take 
active role in decision-making implies a more connected farmer society. 
Adoption of structural conservation practices increase parallel to the increasing role of non-
operator owners in decision-making: Following the farmer typology, the model associates 
different agent types with different tendencies to make certain management decisions.  
We used the ABM to explore the potential impacts of non-operator involvement in 
management decisions because certain conservation practices require financial investment and 
thus owner involvement.  Because non-operators (absentee landowners and investors) have more 
positive attitude towards certain conservation practices (Nassauer et al., 2011, Petrzelka et al., 
2012), their increased involvement resulted in an increase in adoption of conservation practices, 
especially structural practices like filter strips (Figure 3-6A and B).  At the same time, farmer 
awareness of conservation practices is fundamental in adoption decisions. Therefore growing 
numbers of non-operators, who are not well connected to information networks, also discourages 
adoption of some practices. As noted by Nassauer et al. (2011) and confirmed by our model 




non-operators, especially investors  who have limited farming background but positive attitude 






Figure 3-6: Conservation practice adoption distribution for the simulation period (1970-2010) when 
traditional, supplementary and business-oriented farmer agents are the decision makers (A) and when non-
operators (absentee landowners and investors) are involved in decision-making as well (B). Increased 
involvement of non-operators results in an increase in adoption of conservation practices, especially 




Introduction of subsidized crop insurance results in increased non-structural practice 
adoption but decreased structural practice adoption and land retirement program enrollment: 
We also used the ABM to investigate the potential impact of subsidized crop insurance, 
specifically revenue insurance on management decisions of farmers. With revenue insurance in 
place, farmers have a safety net that protects them from fluctuations in both market prices and 
crop yields. The crop insurance policy scenario leads to a homogenous response at the landscape 
since risk management programs tend to promote production across all farmer types.  Our model 
results are consistent with studies (Bosch and Pease 2000; Goodwin and Smith 2003; Babcock 
and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Sheriff, 2005) showing a decrease in CRP 
enrollment and structural practice adoption, but an increase in non-structural practice adoption 






Figure 3-7: Comparison of conservation practice adoption rates under the revenue crop insurance and 
non-operator involvement scenarios. Increased adoption of structural practices when non-operators are 
involved in decision-making (Panel 1 and 2). When revenue crop insurance is provided in both cases when 
operators (Panel 3) and non-operators (Panel 4) are decision makers, structural practice adoption and CRP 
enrollment decreases whereas nutrient management plan implementation increases. 25 ABM simulation runs 
fall between two lines of the same color. 
4. Conclusion 
Farmer typologies are critical for representing diversity in farmers’ decision-making 
characteristics and mechanisms in social models designed to aid policies targeting specific 
conservation practices. Different policy interventions for promoting conservation practices that 
reduce sediment and nutrient runoff may appeal to different farmer types.  The typology 
presented here, based on a synthesis of the adoption literature and the identification of policy-




information networks), comprises a heuristic set of four mutually exclusive types that differs 
from the existing USDA farmer typology (Hoppe et al. 2007; Lambert et al. 2007) in that it 
includes a previously non-differentiated but important group, non-operator owners. Moreover, 
the selection of only policy-relevant characteristics to represent the diversity of Corn Belt farmer 
adoption ensured the classification was parsimonious, as required by ABMs. Incorporating this 
farmer typology and associated heterogeneity into a larger coupled human and natural system 
model in which ABMs are linked with water quality models such as SWAT will help inform the 
assessment of impacts of policy interventions.  Using the ABM populated by this typology 
makes it possible to simplify and represent the diversity of Corn Belt farmers with regards to 
their land management decisions. The ABM results are in line with the documented socio-
economic trends of the Corn Belt and adoption statistics of the modeled conservation practices.  
Considerable changes in the structure of US agriculture and the global socio-economic 
situation over the past decade have had a profound impact on soil and water conservation 
policies and programs. Grain prices have increased continuously (Napier 2009) and are likely to 
continue to do so, leading to increased rental rates (Secchi et al. 2008). In response to high grain 
prices, farmers have attempted to maximize production by taking land out of conservation, 
thereby jeopardizing previous conservation efforts (Napier 2009; Cox et al. 2011). If farmers, 
especially business-oriented farmers, continue to opt for maximization of profits, more set-aside 
land can be expected to be brought back into production, thereby increasing soil erosion rates 
and again raising water quality issues in places where previous policies had achieved some 
environmental quality progress.  
The farmer typology described above demonstrates how different farmer types may be drawn 




arrangement, production size, income source, and information networks. Not only do traditional 
and supplementary farmers have the highest enrollment rates in land-retirement programs such as 
the CRP and WRP, they are also connected to the landscape and behave as ‘citizens of the land’. 
Non-operators, including both absentee landowners and investors, can also be expected to have 
an increasing influence on conservation outcomes as they own increasing amounts of farmland.  
This increased influence makes the land management and conservation decisions to be less 
predictable from a social modelers’ point of view due to the limited number of studies focusing 
on non-operator owners. This group generally has had only limitedly involvement in on-farm 
decision-making in the past.  However, as more and even most farmland begins to be owned by 
non-operators, their involvement may change, and surveys indicate their willingness to adopt 
conservation practices.  
In the hypothetical future scenarios, where we model increased involvement of non-operators 
in management decisions, we observe higher adoption rates for structural practices such as filter 
strips. This potential change in management decisions highlight the importance of land tenure 
change and require further attention on non-operators. Using the ABM as a tool to investigate the 
impacts of subsidized risk management programs leads to an important policy insight. In our 
simulations, subsidized crop insurance programs lead to a homogenous landscape in terms of 
management decisions. As these programs promote production, we observe a reduction in CRP 
enrollment and structural practice adoption.  
The typology presented here, based on characteristics relevant to the adoption of 
conservation practices by Corn Belt grain farmers, and ABM results obtained using this typology 
should enable policy makers to better assess the allocation of conservation program payments 




for use in our ABMs that will be linked to SWAT, we focused on conservation practices 
applicable in SWAT and categorized them as non-structural, structural and land retirement. 
However, from prior studies we know that SWAT is sensitive to management practices such as 
fertilizer management especially application time and rate (Daloğlu et al. 2012). The adoption 
literature is not rich with empirical data about fertilizer management. Thus, to build better-
informed linked models to investigate the impact of farmer behavior on water quality, there is a 
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Chapter 4: An Integrated Social and Ecological Modeling 
Framework - Impacts of Agricultural Conservation 
Practices on Water Quality  
 
Abstract 
We present a new modeling framework that synthesizes social, economic, and ecological 
aspects of landscape change under different agricultural policy scenarios. The social-ecological 
system modeling framework evaluates how different policies, land management preferences, and 
land ownership affect landscape pattern and subsequently downstream water quality. To model 
this system, we link a stylized agent-based model (ABM) of farmers’ conservation practice 
adoption decisions with a watershed model, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to 
simulate the influence of changing land tenure dynamics and the crop revenue insurance in lieu 
of commodity payments on water quality over 41 years (1970-2010) for a predominantly 
agricultural watershed of Lake Erie.  Results show that non-operator owner involvement in land 
management decisions yields the highest reduction in sediment and nutrient loads, and crop 
revenue insurance produces a homogeneous conservation landscape and a slight increase in 
sediment and nutrient loads. However, linking conservation compliance to crop insurance and 





US agricultural policy strongly impacts the land use and land management decisions of 
farmers, especially in predominantly agricultural landscapes. Due its link to agriculture, policies 
often indirectly, but profoundly, impact water quality (Broussard et al., 2012). An overall goal of 
conservation policies with regard to water quality is to reduce sediment and nutrient loss from 
the agricultural landscapes by promoting nutrient efficiency and managing nutrient and sediment 
runoff via conservation practices (Sharpley et al., 1994). Thus, detailed studies of the 
connections between the US agricultural policies and the water quality in estuaries, rivers, and 
lakes can help policymakers provide appropriate incentives for controlling agricultural pollution.   
High surface water concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus, which are important drivers 
of nutrient pollution, are correlated with inputs from fertilizers used for crops (Boyer et al., 2002; 
Galloway et al., 2004; Goolsby, 1999; Howarth et al., 1996; Ribaudo and Smith, 2000), and 
these nutrient loads can accelerate eutrophication of receiving marine and freshwaters.  Although 
increases in the loadings of organic matter and nutrients from land has persisted with 
contributions from industrial development and land conversion, Great Lakes and coastal 
eutrophication did not emerge as a serious problem until the 1950s and 1960s.  The current 
increase in eutrophication is attributed to the intensification in agricultural production and 
concomitant soil erosion and nutrient runoff from non-point sources (Boesch and Brinsfield, 
2000). To address these issues, conservation practices, such as conservation tillage, filter strips, 
land retirement, and nutrient management -- the focus of this research -- are employed to 
mitigate sediment and non-point source nutrient delivery. Moreover, adoption of conservation 
practices is regarded as a strategy to enhance water quality and improve sustainability in 




In this study, we explore linkages between human and environmental systems and the 
implications of these linkages for policy makers. Our framework is one of a social-ecological 
system (SES) that combines decisions and actions of human actors with ecological responses to 
these actions in a reciprocal feedback system. These social-ecological systems are affected by 
multi-dimensional and complex relationships of causal variables arising from the biophysical, 
institutional, infrastructural, demographic, economic, and socio-political contexts.  Hence, SES are 
also considered complex adaptive systems that exhibit emergent properties -- unique properties 
not belonging to human or natural systems separately but emerging from the interactions 
between them (Janssen, 1998; Monticino et al., 2007; Parket et al., 2003; Rammel et al., 2007; 
Levin et al., 2012).  The success or failure of management depends on the extent to which the 
complexities of SESs are considered (Liu et al., 2007).  Even so, in complex systems - such as 
the one we investigate here - unforeseeable and undesirable consequences can result if the 
biophysical and human systems are not examined together; highlighting the need for coupled 
modeling that incorporates dynamic feedback between the social and biophysical model 
components (Veldkamp and Verburg 2004; Levin et al., 2012). 
In this study, we introduce a modeling framework designed to investigate the SES consisting 
of agricultural policy, farmer land management choices, and water quality through investigation of 
the impact of plausible future scenarios on farmer adoption of conservation practices intended to 
enhance water quality. For this purpose, this framework links a social, agent-based model 
(ABM) to study farmer adoption of conservation practices with a biophysical water quality 
model, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT).  The framework defines farmers as owners 
or renters of farmland on which cash crops are grown. Moreover, farmers make decisions about 




environmental information. This framework incorporates the heterogeneity and complexity of 
Corn Belt farmers by defining a farmer typology (Daloğlu et al., in review) in the ABM that 
simulates farmer decisions.  The farmer typology represents the relevant heterogeneity of Corn 
Belt farmers in terms of their tendency towards adoption of conservation practices.  
The focal point of this study is to investigate the impact of plausible future scenarios on this 
SES. The impact is quantified at the watershed scale by modeling the change in water quality 
metrics -- the bioavailable dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) and total phosphorus (TP). 
SWAT incorporates land management decisions with soil properties, climate information, and 
land topography to estimate water quality metrics (Arnold et al., 1998).  
Few water quality models represent farmer decisions regarding land management and 
conservation practice adoption dynamically. Instead most provide ideal conservation practices 
and locations with a goal of minimizing pollutant loading. For example, genetic algorithms have 
been used to optimize the cost of adoption and pollutant reduction from the landscape 
(Maringanti et al., 2008; Rabotyagov et al., 2010; Arabi et al., 2006). Another widely used 
method is representing farmer decisions through surveys that inform conservation practice 
adoption rates and spatial locations (Turpin et al., 2005; Saleh et al., 2007). However, these 
models lack dynamic interactions among farmers and their responses to policy changes. One 
exception is coupling ABM and SWAT to represent adoption of second-generation biofuel crop 
and farmers’ response to markets and policy (Ng et al., 2011). 
2. The Modeling Framework  
The study area is the Sandusky watershed of Lake Erie, which represents a typical watershed 
of the Corn Belt region (Figure 4-1). Historically, Lake Erie has been subject to significant 




source discharges (Dolan and Chapra, 2012; Dolan and McGunagle, 2005); however, non-point 
sources, particularly agriculture, are currently the major causes of nutrient pollution to Lake Erie 
(Forster et al., 2000).  Agricultural runoff has resulted in algal blooms, poor water clarity, and 
summer hypoxia (low oxygen) (Hawley et al., 2006) that can impact commercial and sport 
fisheries, recreation, and drinking water throughout many aquatic and coastal systems (Carpenter 
et al., 2008). To address these issues and remediate Lake Erie eutrophication, effective adoption 
of conservation practices and enterprises will be essential. 
The modeling framework1 consists of several components including the landscape, agents 
(farmers, in a typology that represents their heterogeneity), conservation practice adoption, and 
the ecosystem response to changes in the land management (sediment, DRP, and TP loading), all 
of which were derived from previous studies (Figure 4-2). The farmer typology for adoption of 
conservation practices (Daloğlu et al., in review) represents the heterogeneity among Corn Belt 
farmers and provides the necessary pillar for the design of the ABM. An existing, fully calibrated 
SWAT model of the Sandusky watershed (Daloğlu et al., 2012) is used to simulate nutrient 
loadings as indicators of water quality. With this linked ABM-SWAT framework, we investigate 
how policy and farmer characteristics might drive selection of conservation practices and, in 
turn, their effects on water quality.  
Agent-based models are constructed at the individual decision-making level, hence farmer 
(agent) behavior and decisions are modeled typologically (see Section 2.2). We use this 
modeling framework to investigate plausible future scenarios of US agricultural structure and 
policy. We explore the changes in US agricultural structure specifically in land tenure dynamics 
(see Section 2.3) and influence of crop revenue insurance on farmers’ conservation practice 
                                                 
1 The ABM is implemented in Java using Repast J agent-based libraries within the Eclipse integrated 




adoption decisions (see Section 2.4) as plausible future scenarios. The benefit of following this 
approach is that the exploration of different plausible scenarios helps us explain certain policy 
initiatives affect adoption of conservation practices and their effects on water quality, 
consequently, suggests policy insights. Farmer agents of different types make adoption decisions 
every year on the basis of their decision algorithm (see Section 2.6). If these decisions include 
the adoption of conservation practices, the landscape is altered, which eventually changes the 
land management strategy (see Section 2. 5). The output from the ABM is used to examine 
plausible future scenarios for modifying and reflecting the changes in adopted conservation 
practices (see Section 2.7). Hence, the updated land management map is the crucial input for the 
corresponding SWAT model, where the farmer behavior is transferred to the watershed model 
(see Section 2.8) (Figure 4-2). To understand the impacts of these plausible future scenarios, we 
focus on sediment and phosphorus runoff from the landscape over a 41 year period (1970-2010) 
(see Section 3).  The linked models also respond to the priorities of the Lake Erie Management 
Plan – 2008 (LaMP), which identified nutrient (especially phosphorus) management as the 





Figure 4-1: Locator map for the Sandusky Watershed, Ohio. The study watershed is 







Figure 4-2: The coupled human and natural system of an agricultural landscape in the Corn Belt 
2.1. The Model Landscape 
The model landscape consists of a two-dimensional grid space, built within the ABM, 
abstractly representing the agricultural landscape of the Sandusky watershed. Because the ABM 
is linked with SWAT, the specifics of the water quality model are taken into consideration during 
the ABM setup phase. SWAT uses hydrologic response units (HRU) as fundamental 
computational units. Runoff flow, sediment, and nutrient loads are calculated separately for each 
individual HRU and then summed to determine the total load contribution from each 




scale; therefore SWAT was implemented so that the average HRU size corresponds to the 
average farm size in the Sandusky basin (Daloğlu et al., 2012). This strategy resulted in 147 
subbasins and 351 agricultural HRUs based on the average farm size in the basin (258 acres) 
(USDA, 2009). Therefore, 351 farmers are represented as agents in the ABM.  
2.2. Agents as Farmers 
Farmers have exceptionally diverse characteristics, particularly with regard to their farm size, 
land tenure, education, age, sources of income, and socioeconomic attributes.  To represent the 
heterogeneity of farmers in the Corn Belt region in the ABM, we employ a farmer typology 
(Table 4-1, Daloğlu et al., in review) based on an extensive literature review and previous 
surveys conducted in this watershed region to avoid survey fatigue (Porter, 2004). Because 
ABMs require simplicity (Axelrod, 1997), like others (Valbuena et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 
2012) our typology represents the diversity and heterogeneity among agents in simple terms. 
Due to limited data, representation of the exact location of farms and long-term management 
decisions is not possible. To produce a more generalizable result, we chose to represent the study 
area in a stylized model. The ABM is therefore an abstraction, but one based on and nourished 
by long-term socio-economic trends of the Corn Belt region and when data are available for the 
Sandusky basin where dominantly cash crops such as corn, soybean, and winter wheat are 
grown. Model details are explained in Appendix A using the ODD protocol (Grimm et al., 2006; 
Grimm et al., 2010).   
Building on the previously built farmer typology we have four farmer types: traditional, 
supplementary, business-oriented, and non-operator owners (Daloğlu et al., in review). This 
typology represents the relevant heterogeneity of Corn Belt farmers in terms of their adoption of 




Farmer Type Properties Land Management Attitudes 
Traditional 
Full-owner, small 
operations, dependent on on-
farm income, moderately 
connected to information 
networks 
- favor non-structural practices 
because of potential reduction 
in labor requirements 
- financial investment 
requirement leads to lower 
adoption rates for structural 
practices 
- secure income provided by 




operations, has off-farm 
income, moderately 
connected to information 
networks 
- favor non-structural practices 
because of potential reduction 
in labor requirements 
- substantial off-farm income 
leads to higher adoption rates 
for structural practices. 
- secure income provided by 
land retirement programs is 
appealing 
Business-oriented 
Part-owner, medium to large 
operations, dependent on on-
farm income, highly 
connected to information 
networks 
- favor non-structural practices 
because of potential reduction 
in labor requirements 
- long-term plans and 
dependence on soil quality leads 
to higher structural practice 
adoption 
- focused on profitability, 
leading to low enrollment rates 
in land retirement programs 
Non-operator owner 
Absentee landowners: own the land 
but do not reside on or operate it 
(Petrzelka et al., 2011)  
Investors: describe themselves as 
never having farmed (Nassauer et 
al., 2011). 
 Mutually exclusive subtypes. 
Non-operator owner, 
medium to large operations, 
has off-farm income, least 
connected to information 
networks 
- have less control on land 
management strategies but 
positive attitudes toward 
conservation practices 




2.3. Land Tenure Changes in the Model  
US agriculture has undergone critical changes in land tenure dynamics, especially the 
continuous increase in non-operator ownership followed by an increase in part ownership or full 
renting (Wunderlich 1993; Duffy 2008). Our study site, the Sandusky watershed, followed 
national trends in land tenure dynamics, especially in relation to increased non-operator 
ownership (Daloğlu et al., in review). The impact of this increase on land management strategies 
has been studied in the Corn Belt region (Soule et al., 2000; Petrzelka et al. 2009; Nassauer et al. 
2011, Petrzelka et al., 2011). Structural practices are appealing to non-operators (Nassauer et al., 
2011; Petrzelka et al., 2009). Among absentee landowners, land retirement enrollment is lower in 
the Great Lakes Basin (Petrzelka et al., 2011). However, Nassauer et al., (2011) found investors 
have higher land retirement enrollment rates in a survey of 549 Iowa farmers. 
Because the percentage of both absentee landowners and investors continues to increase, 
further emphasis is given to the relationship between operators and their non-operator owners 
concerning conservation decisions. This is important because nearly half of Corn Belt farmers 
live outside of the county in which they own the land (Petrzelka et al. 2009). We define these 
non-operator owners as absentee landowners (Petrzelka et al. 2009) and previous research has 
shown that as the spatial distance between landowner and tenant increases, the frequency of 
communication decreases (Arbuckle, 2010). We use our framework to investigate the impact of 
changing land tenure dynamics on conservation practice adoption and subsequent water quality 
impacts by modeling increased involvement of non-operator owners in conservation decisions. In 
our simulations, when non-operator owners are involved in the decision-making, we assume the 





2.4. Changes in Agricultural Policy in the Model: Crop Revenue Insurance 
The governance systems and institutions play a role in social-ecological systems.  For example, 
in this linked system, the rights, rules, and decision-making mechanisms that guide farmers’ 
actions may have destructive or constructive impacts on the biophysical system.  At the same time, 
governance systems also provide mechanisms, such as insurance and financial subsidies that can 
help alleviate the negative impacts of biophysical changes on human systems (Kotchen and Young, 
2007).   
Current agricultural policies offer numerous incentives for farmers to adopt conservation 
practices; however, other drivers, including policy incentives, frequently outweigh these, 
resulting in a patchwork of adoption that is not sufficiently effective in improving water quality 
(Doering, 2007).  Current Farm Bill discussions include replacement of commodity payments 
such as direct payments with subsidized crop insurance. Providing subsidized crop insurance to 
US farmers started in 1930 with Dust Bowl and Great Depression and participation levels 
increased in 1980s with the involvement of private insurance industry. In 1985, with the 
introduction of conservation compliance, participation in subsidized crop insurance programs 
required refraining from draining wetlands and implementing a conservation plan when farming 
highly erodible lands. Conservation compliance requires a basic level of conservation as a 
condition for farmer eligibility for agricultural programs, which can be categorized as a 
voluntary, incentive-based policy instrument.  However, in the 1996 Farm Bill, in an effort to 
encourage more farmers to purchase crop insurance, crop insurance was removed from 
compliance requirements (Smith and Glauber, 1997).   
Since 1996, conservation compliance has been tied to commodity payments such as direct 




farmers regardless of crop prices and whether farmers have planted crops. However, because of 
the high cost of emergency disaster payments each year, the current Farm Bill suggests 
replacement of direct payments with subsidized crop insurance.  Currently, farmers can choose 
between two insurance policies, crop yield or revenue insurance, where USDA provides 
subsidies for two-thirds of the cost of farmers’ premium (Coble and Barnett 2013).  Crop yield 
insurance protects farmers from income effects of reduction in agricultural yield due to weather 
and other factors, whereas revenue insurance protects farmers’ income from both market 
fluctuations and yield changes, and indirectly encouraged farmers to increase their production 
area. 
 In light of these discussions, evaluation of crop insurance as a plausible future scenario is 
timely and policy-relevant. The federal crop insurance program can be viewed as a risk 
management tool that provides farmers a safety net. The importance of risk management cannot 
be ignored, indeed uncertainty and risk associated with adoption of new practices is one reason 
for non-adoption. Risk-averse farmers may be reluctant to accept voluntary risks associated with 
conservation practices even if there is a probability of increase in expected returns (Bosch and 
Pease, 2000). Moreover, with the observed variability in weather patterns, farming has become 
increasingly risky in the last decade. To evaluate potential impacts of crop insurance replacing 
commodity payments, we concentrate on revenue insurance, which is protecting farmers’ income 
from both market fluctuations and yield changes (Coble and Barnett 2013).   
Numerous studies have investigated the role of risk aversion in adoption of non-structural 
practices (conservation tillage and no till) and have consistently found a negative relationship 
between risk aversion and practice adoption (Belknap and Saupe, 1993; Bultena and Hoiberg, 




management plan (fertilizer reduction), they generally assume increased yield uncertainty.  
Providing revenue insurance for farmers reduces the risks involved with nutrient management 
plan implementation and non-structural practice adoption (Bosch and Pease, 2000). However, 
interestingly several studies have highlighted drawbacks to crop insurance. For example, a moral 
hazard can result if farmers use crop insurance as an incentive to under fertilize their crops in 
order to receive indemnities (Sheriff 2005).  Goodwin and Smith (2003) also raised concerns 
about crop insurance and other disaster relief programs discouraging land retirement. Another 
criticism is the potential of supporting an increase in production on erodible land (Griffin, 1996; 
Keeton et al. 2002; Goodwin and Vandeveer 2000). Our previous modeling efforts indicate that 
regardless of farmer type, crop revenue insurance promotes increased production, which results 
in a more homogenous conservation landscape (Daloğlu et al., in review).  
2.5. Conservation Practices  
We define land management change as driven by the adoption of four conservation practices 
and government programs that are widely used and could be represented in SWAT (Table 4-2). 
In the model, farmers can adopt combinations of conservation practices to control pollution 
source (nutrient management), trap soil before it reaches water bodies (structural practices, i.e., 
filter strips), promote long-term conservation covers (land retirement, i.e., Conservation Reserve 
Program-CRP), and reduce soil disturbance (non-structural practices, i.e., conservation tillage 
and no-till). Farmers’ annual adoption decisions are then explored under different plausible 
future scenarios (see Section 2.7).   
US agricultural programs generally allow farmers to choose which programs to participate in 
and have flexibility in selecting conservation practices that fit their climate, soils, and, most 




non-structural practices, nutrient management plans, and enrollment in land retirement is 
voluntary.  Each farmer determines whether to participate in land retirement or adopt certain 
practices depending on policy incentives and the farmer’s overall objectives. Land retirement 
programs such as Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) generally remove land from agricultural 
production for a long period (at least 10 years) or, in some cases, permanently.  Structural 
practices are eligible for cost-share; farmers receive 50% of the implementation cost from the 
federal government as an economic incentive and are required to make multi-year commitments. 
When farmers receive economic incentives for structural practice adoption and land retirement 
enrollment, non-compliance to these programs and practices before the contract ends is 
accompanied by penalties (Claassen, 2012). Because non-structural practice adoption and 
enrollment in nutrient management plans do not provide economic incentives, non-compliance to 
these practices do not entail penalties in the model.   
In this model, farmers consider the expected utility of adoption decisions influenced by profit 
generated by agricultural production, their intrinsic attributed, and their neighbor’ adoption 
decisions. Because land retirement contracts and structural practices require multi-year 
commitments, whereas adoption of non-structural practices and nutrient management plans are 
made annually, these decisions have temporal consequences, and therefore in the model, 
farmers’ participation is dynamic.  
The conservation practices available to farmers have been implemented and promoted 
widely; however, few field studies have examined their effectiveness. (Easton et al., 2008; 
Makarewicz, 2009; Lemke et al., 2011; Cullum et al., 2006; Gitau et al., 2005). The existing field 
studies measuring the effectiveness of these conservation practices report a wide range of results 




effectiveness of these practices depends on the landscape properties, implementation location 
and implementation extend. With this perspective in mind, in this framework, the effect of 
farmers’ adoption of conservation practices on water quality outcome depends in part on the 
spatial distribution of these practices across a watershed.  
Conservation 
Practice Categories  
Conservation 
Practices 
Economic and Environmental 
Benefits 
Non-structural Conservation tillage, no-till 
Reduces soil erosion from both water 
and wind, increases organic matter 
and enhances water quality. Reduces 






Enhances water quality by trapping 
soil particles, nutrients and pesticides; 
improves water infiltration; enhances 








Plants long-term, resource conserving 
covers. Reduces soil erosion from 
highly erodible lands (HEL), restores 






Reduces nutrient application on 
agricultural landscape and eventually 
reduces nutrient runoff.  
Table 4-2: Conservation practice categories applicable in SWAT models (modified and adapted 
from Daloğlu et al., in review). 
2.6. Conservation Practice Adoption Decisions in the Model 
This model addresses the critical information gap in effectively and efficiently employing 
conservation programs: understanding why some farmers do not adopt conservation practices 
and understanding how to affect spatial relationships among farmers who do and do not adopt 




farmer decides on a land management strategy for conservation practice adoption (Table 4-2). 
The decision-making algorithm includes income generated from government programs and 
agricultural production, influence of the farmers’ neighbors, and farmers’ intrinsic attributes 
(details in Appendix A). Farmers can choose to adopt none or a combination of available 
practices. 
Depending on farmers’ agricultural profit generated, preferences, and on the actions of the 
neighbors, farmers react differently to the same agricultural policies. Every farmer in the model 
uses the same decision algorithm but with different parameters based on the heterogeneity of 
preferences. A critical variable in the model is whether owners or operators make adoption 
decisions. Most empirical research concludes that operators control decisions regarding 
production and adoption of conservation practices on farmland owned by non-operators 
(Arbuckle, 2010; Constance et al., 1996; Soule et al., 2000); however, we also investigate the 
possible impact of the growing proportions of farmland owned by non-operators and their 
influence on adoption decisions (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4). 
In the ABM, farmers calculate their agricultural profit generated from production and collect 
financial incentives provided by enrollment in government programs. For agricultural profit, 
farmers use Bayesian inference for expectation formation of price and yield in the form of a 
probability distribution. We represent farmer heterogeneity by setting different parameters for 
Bayesian updating for different farmer types. For example, traditional farmers have more stable 
price and yield expectations and business-oriented farmers are better following the fluctuations 
in the market because we assume that they are more connected to the information networks.  




each year, farmers use publicly available price and yield information and their experiences and 
characteristics of their type to form future price and yield expectations.  
Farmers also observe their social and spatial network and evaluate which practices their 
neighbors adopt. Non-operators (absentee landowners and investors) are initially not connected 
to the information networks, whereas operators (traditional, supplementary and business-oriented 
farmers) are connected to both spatial and social networks. Business-oriented farmers have 
higher network connectedness compared to traditional and supplementary farmers (Daloğlu et 
al., in review). Farmers’ intrinsic environmental attitudes toward each available conservation 
practice, as reflected in their type (Table 4-1), also influence their adoption decisions. Once all 
information is gathered, farmers use their decision algorithm to decide which conservation 
practice to adopt (see Appendix A). 
2.7. Plausible Future Scenarios 
The primary goal of this modeling framework is to understand farmer adoption of 
conservation practices and subsequent impacts on water quality under plausible future scenarios. 
For this purpose, we constructed four plausible future scenarios intended to form a bridge 
between the science of land management and policy development (Table 4-3). At the same time, 
these scenarios are intended to be prospective and informative rather than projective or 
prescriptive of the future (Nassauer and Corry, 2004). We use these scenarios to evaluate 
simulated land management patterns and determine possible water quality implications. Our 
integrated method, linking a social model with a biophysical model contributes to the growing 



























 NO YES 
NO 1 Baseline  
Simplified representation of 
existing land tenure and 
policy context 
2 Non-operator owners involvement 
Increased non-operator involvement in 
land management decisions 
YES 3 Crop revenue insurance 
Only operators are decision 
makers and crop revenue 
insurance is available as a 
risk management tool 
Available to all operators as 
a risk management tool  
4 Crop revenue insurance with non-
operator owner involvement 
Both operators and non-operators owners 
are decision makers and crop revenue 
insurance is available as a risk 
management tool 
Table 4-3: Land management strategies tested under different agricultural policy and structure scenarios 
The Baseline scenario (1) represents a simplified version of existing land tenure where operators 
(traditional, supplementary and business-oriented farmers) are responsible for conservation 
practice adoption decisions and non-operator owners have no involvement in production and 
conservation decisions. In this scenario existing crop insurance programs are not represented and 
crop revenue insurance is not offered in lieu of commodity payments.   
The Non-operator owner involvement scenario (2) simulates the potential impact of non-operator 
owners being more involved in decisions about conservation practice adoption. This premise 
follows recent research that demonstrated positive attitudes of non-operator owners for certain 
conservation practices (Petrzelka et al., 2009; Nassauer et al., 2011). In this scenario, we assume 
natural resource agencies and NGOs reach out to non-operator owners and effectively inform 
them about existing and available conservation practices (Table 4-4).  
The Crop revenue insurance scenario (3) follows the latest US Farm Bill discussions about 




subsidies. This scenario does not assume that conservation compliance is required for land to be 
eligible for crop revenue insurance. In this scenario, only operators are decision makers and they 
purchase crop revenue insurance at 75% coverage level for all the land that they manage 
including the rented land. Crop revenue insurance provides an accessible risk management tool 
to operators and at the same time encourages an increased production area (Table 4-4). 
The Crop revenue insurance with non-operator owner involvement scenario (4) presents the 
plausible changes both in land tenure and policy by assuming non-operators owners as active 
decision makers when crop revenue insurance is offered in lieu of commodity payments. Crop 
revenue insurance provides a safety net and indirectly motivates both operators and non-operator 
owners to increase their production area (Table 4-4). 
       Assumptions in the model 
Non-operator owner 
involvement 
- When non-operator owners are involved in the decision-
making, the rate of involvement increases from 0% to 
eventually reach 50% at the end of the simulation 
- Absentee landowners are only connected to social network 
but not to the spatial network because they live out of the 
county that they own  
- Investors are connected both to the spatial and social network 
Crop revenue insurance 
- Farmers buy subsidized crop revenue insurance premium 
with 75% coverage level 
- Buying crop revenue insurance changes farmers’ land 
management preferences 
- Both non-operator owners and operators buy crop revenue 
insurance for both the land they own and rent.  
- Conservation compliance is not linked to crop revenue 
insurance 
- Rental rates of non-operator owners’ reflect the revenue risk 
reduction represented by crop revenue insurance 
Table 4-4: Assumptions embedded in scenario simulations 
2.8. Water Quality Model - SWAT 
The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) is a distributed and spatially explicit 




divides watersheds into subbasins with hydrologic response units (HRU) that represent areas 
with common land cover, management, and slope and soil properties (Arnold et al. 1998). It is a 
process-based model of surface hydrology, weather, sedimentation, soil temperature, crop 
growth, nutrients, pesticides, and groundwater that can simulate the effects of climate and land 
use changes on nutrient and sediment delivery from watersheds (Arnold et al., 1998) that is used 
widely for evaluating and predicting impacts of conservation practices (Arabi et al., 2008).   
SWAT models have been developed and applied for Lake Erie watersheds to predict 
potential impacts of conservation practice adoption on water quality (Bosch et al. 2011). More 
recent SWAT applications indicate that more aggressive strategies than currently employed are 
needed to substantially reduce nutrient and sediment delivery (Bosch et al. (a, in review), 
especially under anticipated future climates (Bosch et al. (b, in review).     
For this study, we used an existing, higher spatial resolution SWAT model developed for the 
Sandusky watershed (Daloğlu et al., 2012). The model is employed at a spatial scale in which the 
smallest computational unit of SWAT, average HRU size, corresponds to the average farm size 
in the Sandusky basin (258 acres; USDA, 2009). The model was calibrated and validated with 
extensive daily observed flow and water quality data for the simulation period (1970-2010) and 
can be used for future scenario testing. Our previous modeling efforts indicated the importance 
of farmer management decisions on nutrient delivery especially on DRP runoff (Daloğlu et al., 
2012).   
3. Modeling Framework: Water Quality Impacts of Land Management Strategies 
This modeling framework is used to evaluate the impacts of farm-scale decisions at the 
watershed scale, a scale large enough to be policy-relevant, and thus relevant to plausible future 




framework. Because model parameters are sampled from distributions for decision-making 
algorithms, each scenario consists of 25 runs.  For each run, farmers update their adoption 
decisions annually under plausible future scenarios such as changes in the land tenure or policy.  
During the simulation phase, farmers of different types adopt conservation practices based on 
a behavioral model consisting of their agricultural profit generated from production, their 
preferences towards conservation practices, and the adoption decisions of their neighbors and 
other farmers in their social network. After farmers decide whether to adopt a specific 
conservation practice or not, the results lead to an update of the landscape. We link ABM output 
to SWAT and report water quality model output as the average of the 25 SWAT runs for the 41-





Figure 4-3: Process overview and scheduling for the modeling framework 
3.1. Linking ABM with SWAT 
Once all farmer adoption status is updated, the ABM output in the abstract grid file provides 
the adoption status for every farmer in every period and is used to make the necessary updates in 
relevant input files of SWAT in the Sandusky watershed file. Abstract grid cell characteristics 
are assigned to Sandusky watershed locations by the smallest computational unit of SWAT, 




2010) to provide water quality metrics such as sediment and phosphorus loads.  The input files 
for SWAT are all in ASCII text format, making it easy to interface with the ABM and this 
linkage is supported with the MatLab programming language.  
For each year, farmers’ decisions regarding conservation practice adoption are used to 
modify several SWAT input files. For example, if a farmer adopts non-structural practices such 
as no-till instead of conventional tillage, the land management input file (.mgt) in SWAT is 
modified to reflect this change. Similarly, if a farmer adopts structural practices such as filter 
strips, the operations input file (.ops) is updated with a filter strip of 10 m width. Because 
farmers receive economic incentives to adopt structural practices, their continued use of filter 
strips is expected. For enrollment in land retirement programs, we change the land cover type in 
the input file (.mgt) to be one of the perennial covers such as big bluestem without fertilizer 
application. Once a farmer enrolls in land retirement programs, adherence to the contract is 
mandatory for at least 10 years as a requirement of the program. If a farmer adopts nutrient 
management plan, then a 20% reduction in fertilizer application rate is assumed. This change is 
also reflected in the management input file of SWAT (.mgt).  
The decision algorithm used by our farmers includes social and spatial networks which 
influence their adoption decisions. Throughout the simulation period, farmers are programmed to 
observe their neighbors and the conservation practices they adopt. Therefore, in our model, the 
process of conservation practice adoption has the necessary spatial component and shows 
variance in each simulation. For the purposes of illustration, we reported the average load 
reductions from numerous simulations but also included the variability in error bars (Figures 4-9 
and 4-10). Due to the stochasticity built-in the model, in each ABM initialization, different 




characteristics. Each ABM run result has different spatial locations for conservation practices. 
The initial spatial distribution of farmer types affects the social and spatial network structure and 
has thus an impact on the final spatial distribution of adopted practices. For example, if a farmer 
located in the downstream part of the watershed adopts a conservation practice, its impact on 
water quality would be different than adopting a practice in the upstream part of the watershed. 
To eliminate this initial condition bias, we perform numerous ABM runs and link those to 
SWAT, which yields differences in water quality metrics as well; hence the bars demonstrate this 
impact of the different implementation locations of the conservation practices.  
3.2. Impact of Land Tenure Change 
US agriculture has undergone a structural change of land tenure with a decline in full-
ownership and an increase in non-operator ownership and large scale operations (Wunderlich 
1993; Duffy 2008). In this context, in particular, the role of the understudied group of 
landowners, non-operator owners, in land management decisions deserves more attention 
(Nassauer et al., 2011; Petrzelka et al., 2009) and our farmer typology includes a separate 
category for them. In our ABM, we assume that traditional farmers after age 65, switch to be 
non-operator owners or sell their land to business-oriented or supplementary farmers which leads 
to an increase in the percentage of business-oriented farmers who own large scale productions 
and supplementary farmers who own small operations, and a decrease in traditional farmers who 
own the land that they farm (Figure 4-4A). We assume supplementary and business-oriented 
farmers to not change their types as they age. In addition, this change in landownership also 
leads to an increase in the percentage of non-operator owners (absentee landowners and 
investors) among the farmer population (Figure 4-4B) and the production area under their control 




(Appendix A; Wunderlich, 1993; Blandford and Hill, 2006; Duffy, 2008; USDA, 2009). Because 
ABM results denote the adoption status for a given farmer in every period, taking averages of 
multiple simulations is not possible. For that reason, in Figures 4-4 to 4-8, 25 ABM simulation 
runs are represented between two lines of the same color.  
According to our farmer typology, different farmer types have different tendencies to make 
certain adoption decisions. Therefore, as the composition of the farmer types in the population 
changes, the emergent adoption pattern of conservation practices evolves. For example, in the 
scenario where the non-operator owners are not involved with decision-making and crop revenue 
insurance is not available (Scenario 1), the percentage of farmers who adopt nutrient 
management and structural practices show a significant increase, with a more pronounced 
increase in nutrient management adoption (Figure 4-6). Because non-structural practices, such as 
no-till technologies had not yet been developed until the mid-1980s, those practices were not 
present in the model for the first 15 years of the simulation run. However, in the mid-1980s non-
structural practices became available and the composition of the farmer population evolved, 
leading to a significant increase in the percentage of farmers who adopt these practices over the 
next 10 years. Land retirement, on the other hand, had very limited implementation, due mostly 
to the requirement for enrolled land to be retired for 10 years, with penalties for noncompliance 
(Figure 4-6A and 4-10). In scenario 2, when non-operator owners take an active role in 
decisions, they have higher adoption rates for structural practices and land retirement (Figure 4-6 
and 4-8).  
Comparing scenarios 1 and 2 illustrates the water quality impacts of the plausible future 
when non-operator owners take an active role in land management decisions in the absence of 




period 50% of the non-operator owners are the decision makers for conservation practice 
adoption (Table 4-4). The impact of the positive attitudes of non-operator owners for 
conservation practices and higher adoption rates for structural practices and enrollment in land 
retirement programs is reflected in lower TP loads (Figures 4-8, 4-9, and 4-11). That is, the non-
operator owners’ involvement in decision-making increases the adoption of conservation 
practices that are more effective in mitigating nutrient runoff from agricultural landscape. 
Results for sediment, organic P (OrgP), and DRP load are similar, with the improvement more 
pronounced for sediment load because non-operator owners favor structural practices, which are 





Figure 4-4: Percentage of farmer types in the total farmer population (A), percentage of non-operator 
owners in the total farmer population throughout the simulation period. 25 ABM simulation runs fall 







Figure 4-5: Percentage of land under non-operator owners’ control increases. 25 ABM simulation runs 





Figure 4-6: Scenario 1- Conservation practice adoption distribution for the simulation period (1970-2010) 
when traditional, supplementary and business-oriented farmers are the decision makers (A) and Scenario 2 - 
when non-operator owners (absentee landowners and investors) are also involved in decision-making (B). 
Increased involvement of non-operator owners results in an increase in the adoption of conservation 
practices, especially structural practices like filter strips. 25 ABM simulation runs fall between two lines of 




3.3. Impact of Agricultural Policy Change 
Proposed changes to the US Farm Bill suggest replacing commodity payments with 
subsidized crop revenue insurance premiums to create stronger incentives for farmers to enroll in 
crop revenue insurance. In our simulations, conservation compliance is not required for crop 
revenue insurance enrollment. The effects of such supports can be seen by comparing Scenarios 
1 and 3 (Table 4-3). Crop revenue insurance protects farmers from both market and crop yield 
fluctuations and because crop revenue insurance payments depend on production area, farmers 
are indirectly encouraged to increase their production area. Under this scenario, nutrient 
management plans and non-structural practices increase, with a more prevalent rise in nutrient 
management, and a steep increase in adoption of non-structural practices when these practices 
become available (Figure 4-7). The ABM results also indicate a decrease in land retirement and 
land allocated to structural practices regardless of the non-operator owner involvement 
(Scenarios 3 & 4) which leads to a more homogenous conservation landscape, in the absence of 
conservation compliance (Figure 4-7). When subsidized crop revenue insurance is available, 
average TP, OrgP, DRP, and sediment loads are higher (Figures 4-9 and 4-11), due mainly to the 






Figure 4-7: Comparison of conservation practice adoption rates under the plausible scenarios such as 
crop revenue insurance and non-operator owner involvement in decision-making. Scenario 1: Only operators 
are decision makers with the support of crop revenue insurance. Scenarios 2: Both operators and non-
operator owners take active role adoption decisions. Scenario 3: Crop revenue insurance is offered in lieu of 
commodity payments to operators. Scenario 4: Crop revenue insurance is offered in lieu of commodity 
payments to both operators and non-operator owners who are active decision makers. When crop revenue 
insurance premiums are subsidized, structural practice adoption and land retirement enrollment rates 
decrease both for operators and non-operator owners whereas enrollment in nutrient management plans 






Figure 4-8: Structural practice adoption and land retirement enrollment show significant variability for 
different scenarios. When non-operator owners are active decision makers, structural practices have high 
adoption rates (Scenarios 2 and 4). Land retirement enrollment is highest when non-operator owners are 
active decision makers and crop revenue insurance is not offered to replace commodity payments as a risk 





Figure 4-9: Comparison of average annual total phosphorus (TP) load in kilograms for Scenarios 1-4 
representing the average of 25 ABM simulations linked to SWAT. 
 
Figure 4-10: Comparing scenarios with Scenario 1 in terms of sediment, organic phosphorus (OrgP), 
dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP), and total phosphorus (TP) loads, representing the average of 25 ABM 







Figure 4-11: Spatial representation of average total phosphorus yield (1970-2010). Owner involvement 
results in lower TP yield (Scenario 2), whereas introduction of subsidized crop revenue insurance results in 




3.4. Modifications in Agricultural Policy in the Model: Closing the SES loop 
In the modeling framework, to evaluate the impact of agricultural policy change, we 
build plausible scenarios that follow the latest US Farm Bill discussions of providing 
federally subsidized crop revenue insurance rather than commodity production subsidies 
(Scenario 3). In our simulations, we assume that conservation compliance is not tied to crop 
revenue insurance. The linked model results suggest slightly higher TP, OrgP, DRP, and 
sediment yields (Figure 4-9). This increase in water quality metrics compared to the baseline 
(Scenario 1) is attributed to the reduction in structural practice and land retirement 
enrollment (Figure 4-10). 
To model a complete SES where social and environmental systems have a reciprocal 
feedback system, we add a policy modification step. Once the policies are modified, farmers 
have a new set of incentives, sanctions, and regulations to observe. For this purpose, as a 
plausible policy modification, we linked conservation compliance to crop revenue insurance. 
Moreover, we utilize our framework to evaluate different conservation compliance definitions. 
Currently, conservation compliance requires farmers to refrain from draining wetlands and 
implement a conservation plan when farming highly erodible lands. For simulation purposes, 
we treat Sandusky watershed as a critical source area and require every farmer to implement a 
conservation plan for crop revenue insurance participation.  
Residue management is an important and effective method of achieving conservation 
compliance requirements and most farmers implement non-structural practices (i.e., 
conservation tillage or no-till systems) to reduce sediment erosion. However, conservation 
compliance has been critiqued for its narrow focus on erosion control. In fact, nutrient runoff 




2002; Galloway et al., 2004; Ribaudo and Smith, 2000) but an indirect focus of conservation 
compliance.  For example, non-structural practices are promoted for erosion control but could 
lead to increased DRP runoff (Daloğlu et al., 2012; Kleinman et al., 2011).  
There have been discussions of strengthening and expanding conservation compliance 
requirements (American Farmland Trust, 2011; Cox et al., 2011; Perez, 2007). In our 
framework, we tested three conservation compliance definitions where farmers can (a) either 
choose non-structural or structural practices; (b) adopt non-structural; (c) implement structural 
practices to qualify conservation compliance requirements and be eligible for subsidized crop 
revenue insurance programs (Table 4-5).  
Required Conservation Practice Definition of Conservation Compliance in the model 
(a) Either non-structural or structural 
practices 
Choose between non-structural and structural practice 
(b) Non-structural practices Adopt no-till practices, focus on erosion control 
(c) Structural practices Implement filter strips, focus on water quality 
Table 4-5: Different definitions of conservation compliance 
Linked model results indicate the effectiveness of structural practices in reducing nutrient 
delivery from agricultural landscape (Figure 4-12). The current definition of conservation 
compliance requires farmers to implement necessary practices to control soil erosion. With 
the conservation compliance, the monitoring and enforcement of compliance deserves 
attention. As Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2003) emphasized, the compliance 
enforcement needs updating and upgrading in regulations and monitoring. Part of the 
problem arises as Natural Resources Conservation Services (NRCS) is both the enforcement 
agency and working with farmers to implement the practices as well. Non-compliance can 




farmer to pay back current and prior year’s payments (Stubbs, 2012). However, NRCS 
provides numerous reasons for farmers to overturn a violation.  
In our models, we assume farmers show 100% adherence to conservation compliance and 
choose from non-structural or structural practices to fulfill conservation compliance 
requirements. Because of mostly economic reasons, they choose non-structural practices to 
qualify for conservation compliance. We observe higher nutrient runoff, especially the 
bioavailable DRP when farmers choose non-structural practices as conservation compliance 
requirements. However, investigating different conservation compliance definitions is 
promising. If conservation compliance requirements are expanded to include nutriment 
management as a focus and promote structural practices to trap nutrients before reaching to 






Figure 4-12: Change in water quality metrics when conservation compliance is linked to crop revenue 
insurance programs as a requirement. In Scenario 3 only operators and in Scenario 4 both operators and 
owners are decision makers; crop revenue insurance is available in lieu of commodity payments. 
Conservation compliance requires adoption of (a) either non-structural or structural practices; (b) non-
structural or (c) structural practices. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Policy Implications of this Framework 
This framework provides a powerful tool to explore the impacts of plausible futures such as 
changes in the agricultural land tenure and policy on adoption of conservation practices.  Our 
model distinguishes between nutrient management plans to reduce fertilizer applications, non-
structural practices such as conservation and no-till, structural practices such as filter strips to 
trap soil particles and nutrients, and land retirement programs. Importantly, this model shows 
that changes in land tenure and crop insurance policy affect adoption of these practices, altering 




By investigating the water quality impacts of four plausible scenarios, we demonstrate the 
importance of the understudied non-operator owners and the possible effects of new policies for 
crop revenue insurance. Our results indicate maximum load reductions, especially sediment load 
reductions, occur when non-operator owners are involved in the decision-making process and 
when crop revenue insurance is not offered in lieu of commodity payments (Scenario 2). This 
improvement is mainly attributed to the increase in the percentage of farmers who favor 
structural practices, which are more effective in reducing sediment and nutrient load. The linked 
model results also point to a positive influence of non-operator owner involvement and highlight 
the importance of devising innovative policy changes to reach out and inform non-operator 
owners about the existing water quality problems, possible solutions, and their role in 
implementing them.  
Unlike the Scenario 2, if subsidized crop revenue insurance is promoted as a risk 
management program, in the absence of conservation compliance, this indirectly incentivizes 
farmers, regardless of their type, to increase production area, even including areas that are highly 
erodible or wetlands. This then results in a homogenous conservation landscape, which yields 
slightly higher loads (Scenarios 3 and 4) because of a decrease in structural practice adoption and 
land retirement enrollment. To discourage farmers from farming highly erodible land and 
draining wetlands, a main target for conservation compliance, eligibility for crop revenue 
insurance premiums could be tied to conservation compliance.  Coupling conservation with the 
crop revenue insurance program is critical, as has been shown in a recent analysis in Iowa 
revealing that the rate of erosion from productive agricultural land to be higher than the 
sustainable rate (Cox et al., 2011). Our model results demonstrate that structural practices are 




structural practices as well as non-structural practices are promising approaches to improve water 
quality. A recent survey of Iowa farmers reveals support for expanding conservation compliance 
requirements to include nutrient management as well as erosion control (Arbuckle, 2013). 
Moreover, because structural practices are visible from satellite images, enforcement of 
conservation compliance would require fewer NRCS personnel and less federal budget.  
Our analyses show only modest load reduction (1-6%) under the plausible future scenarios, 
which is comparable to other relevant applications of SWAT which assume feasible levels of 
implementation (Arabi et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2010; Tuppad et al., 2013, Bosch et al., in review). 
The adoption rates of conservation practices are also consistent with the observations (Bosch and 
Pease 2000; Goodwin and Smith 2003; Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 
1996; Sheriff, 2005; Wunderlich 1993; Duffy 2008; Petrzelka et al. 2009; Nassauer et al. 2011) 
and feasible levels of implementation used by other SWAT models (Bosch et al., a (in review), 
Arabi et al., 2008; Tuppad et al., 2010).  Even though our results provide an important starting 
point for the comparison of different plausible scenarios, considering the modest differences in 
water quality metrics between different scenarios, they still point to the need for innovative 
policy scenarios to promote adoption of conservation practices and highlight the need for further 
discussions on attaching conservation compliance to crop revenue insurance and definition of 
conservation compliance requirements. Indeed, previous SWAT models implemented in the 
Lake Erie Basin indicate up to 30-40% yield reduction effectiveness with significantly increased 
adoption rates (Bosch et al., a, in review).  
In this framework we chose to model water quality impacts with retroactive modeling, 
because our existing watershed model was calibrated and validated for 1970-2010. In future 




inclusion of possible climate change scenarios. The use of future climate projections could 
possibly increase the uncertainty in the linked model results but still be informative for 
adaptation efforts (Bosch et al. (b, in review).  
4.2. Challenges of Linking Agent-based Models with Biophysical Models 
This framework is designed to investigate the impact of alternative policy approaches and 
changing land tenure dynamics on farmer adoption of conservation practices intended to increase 
the water quality. For this purpose, we chose to link SWAT with ABM for farmer adoption of 
conservation practices. Because SWAT is a river basin scale water quality model developed to 
assess the water quality benefits of conservation practices (Gassman et al. 2007; Osmond 2010), 
linking it with ABM aligns with the purpose of our framework.   
For this framework, we chose a loose integration method which uses the state variables from 
one model as a driving variable in the other model (Antle et al., 2001). In Figure 4-2, the ABM 
determines the land management pattern for the Sandusky watershed and SWAT estimates water 
quality metrics as a function of the updated land management pattern. One of the disadvantages 
of using loosely coupled models is the computational overhead associated extracting output files 
and modifying input files. We used MatLab programming language to link ABM output and 
modify necessary SWAT input files.  Single SWAT run including the modification of input files 
for 41 years (1970-2010) averaged about 55 minutes when run on quad-core Windows machine. 
Because of the stochasticity built in the model, we performed 25 simulations and reported the 
averages of these runs for water quality metrics, which resulted in approximately 1,375 minutes 
or 0.95 days.  
In this framework, we aimed to represent the farm-scale decision making regarding 




of farms and long-term management decisions is not possible. Therefore, we constructed an 
abstract ABM without the spatial representation of decision making process which could affect 
the farmers’ conservation decisions because soil properties and slope of their land are not 
influential in their adoption decisions.  
The capabilities of SWAT were the determining factor for the scale of the linked model. We 
developed a fine-scale SWAT model to match the average farm size in the Sandusky basin 
(Daloğlu et al., 2012). However, SWAT is not developed on grid cells and the smallest 
computational unit of SWAT, hydrologic response units (HRU) cannot be manually delineated 
which complicates the representation of farm level decision making.  
Linking social and biophysical models for social-ecological system representation is 
profoundly valuable, especially in evaluating plausible policy scenarios. While the recent land 
use and land change research has contributed to this endeavor, this study goes one step further by 
linking a widely used water quality model to ABM to better represent the dynamic interactions 
of farmers.  
5. Conclusion  
This study introduces a modeling framework designed to investigate the impact of plausible 
future scenarios such as changes in agricultural land tenure and crop insurance policy on farmer 
adoption of conservation practices intended to improve water quality. This framework focuses on 
an agricultural watershed in the Corn Belt with attention to spatial patterns and socio-economic 
drivers of farmers’ conservation practice adoption.  The key model elements are factors that 
influence remediation of eutrophication in downstream waters. Hence, with this framework we 
investigated both the interactions among farmers and the emergent impacts of those interactions 




This framework is novel in linking an ABM of farmers’ conservation practice decisions and a 
water quality model investigating the impact of conservation practices. It can serve as a powerful 
tool in policy analysis as it represents the effects of farm level decision-making on a watershed 
scale agricultural landscape. In the framework, farmer heterogeneity is represented by the farmer 
types that populate agents (Daloğlu et al., in review) in the ABM that then generates 
conservation practice adoption patterns that, in turn, are employed as input to the water quality 
model (Daloğlu et al., 2012).  
This framework analyzes how water quality is affected in future scenarios for conservation 
practices at the farm scale of the Sandusky watershed. Four plausible future scenarios are 
investigated, which focus on the involvement of owners in the decision-making of the farm and 
crop revenue insurance as a risk management program in lieu of commodity payments. These 
scenarios are plausible given that they are built upon recent discussions on crop revenue 
insurance policies and documented increase of non-operator owners. The investigation of 
plausible scenarios reveals the significance of non-operator owners and their potential impact on 
the agricultural landscape and consequently on water quality. The highest nutrient and sediment 
reduction is achieved when non-operator owners had active role in conservation decisions. On 
the contrary, model results indicate a possible increase in nutrient and sediment loads with 
subsidized crop revenue insurance, in the absence of cross compliance with conservation, with 
an emphasis on increasing production area. The model results also suggest expanding the 
conservation compliance requirements to include nutrient management focused practices such as 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The three chapters of this dissertation build the framework to study and model one of the 
highly cultivated agricultural watersheds of the Lake Erie, the Sandusky watershed, as a social-
ecological system. Renewed harmful algal blooms and hypoxia in Lake Erie have drawn 
significant attention to phosphorus loads, particularly increased dissolved reactive phosphorus 
(DRP) from highly agricultural watersheds.  Chapter 2 builds the SWAT model to estimate 
dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) in the agriculture-dominated Sandusky watershed for 1970-
2010 to explore potential reasons for the increased DRP load from Lake Erie watersheds.  
Chapter 3 develops a farmer typology based on a synthesis of the adoption literature and the 
identification of policy-relevant farmer characteristics, and uses this typology to populate an 
agent-based model (ABM) to simulate adoption of conservation practices.  Chapter 4 introduces 
the modeling framework designed to investigate the impact of plausible future scenarios such as 
changes in the land tenure and policy on the farmers’ adoption of conservation practices intended 
to increase the water quality using. This framework is novel in linking an agent-based model 
(ABM) of farmers’ conservation practice decisions (Chapter 3) and a water quality model 
investigating the impact of conservation practices (Chapter 2). 
Renewed Eutrophication Causes in Lake Erie 
Renewed harmful algal blooms and hypoxia in Lake Erie have drawn significant attention to 
phosphorus loads, particularly increased dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) from highly 




using SWAT which explores the role of several potential causes of the recent increases in DRP 
loading suggested by the Ohio P Task Force (Ohio EPA, 2010): 1) changes in fertilizer 
application rates; 2) widespread adoption of no-till and conservation tillage practices after the 
mid-1990s; 3) stratification of phosphorus (P) in the upper layer of the soil; 4) increased fall 
fertilizer application since the mid-1990s; and 5) changes in rainfall patterns.   
To better understand the impact of land management and weather patterns on DRP loading, 
hypothetical scenarios are generated and then compared with the realistic representation of the 
agricultural landscape (baseline scenario). Hypothetical scenarios represent extreme cases such 
as high and low fertilizer application rates, full adoption of no-till and conventional tillage, 
representation of phosphorus accumulation at soil surface layer, and synthetic weather patterns. 
The comparisons of these hypothetical scenarios with the baseline scenario emphasize the 
need to focus on agricultural practices and their impact on water quality.  The results 
demonstrated the importance of P stratification in soil surface layer caused by no-till practices 
and increased frequency of storm events observed in the last decade in the recent rise of DRP 
exported the agricultural landscape. 
Farmer Diversity and Conservation Practice Adoption  
To model farmer adoption of conservation practices, Chapter 3 first develops a farmer 
typology to represent the heterogeneity of Corn Belt farmers relevant to conservation practice 
adoption and then uses this typology to populate agents in the agent-based model (ABM) that 
models the adoption decision under different policy scenarios.  
Typologies have been suggested as effective tools to represent the heterogeneity of farmers’ 
motivations and socio-economic circumstances related to conservation behavior (Kostrowicki 




policy-relevant farmer characteristics are identified, namely land tenure arrangements, size of 
farm, source of income, and information networks. These farmer characteristics comprise a 
heuristic set of four mutually exclusive types: traditional, supplementary, business-oriented 
farmers, and non-operator owners.  Since this typology is operationalized for use in our ABMs 
that will be linked to SWAT, conservation practices applicable in SWAT are categorized as non-
structural (no till and conservation tillage), structural (filter strips), and land retirement 
(Conservation Reserve Program, CRP).  
The analysis of farmer typology demonstrates how different farmer types may be drawn to 
different conservation practices and policies depending on the relative importance of tenure 
arrangement, production size, income source, and information networks. Traditional and 
supplementary farmers have high adoption rates for non-structural practices and land retirement 
programs, whereas business-oriented farmers focus on profitability and has lower adoption rates 
of land retirement programs. An understudied group of non-operator owners (absentee 
landowners and investors) have limited involvement in land management decisions; however 
surveys indicate their willingness to adopt conservation practices. In addition, more and even 
most farmland begins to be owned by non-operator owners. 
The farmer types populate the agents in the ABM and the ABM results are in line with the 
documented socio-economic trends of the Corn Belt and adoption statistics of the modeled 
conservation practices. Chapter 3 also investigates the impact of future plausible scenarios on 
adoption patterns such as increased involvement of non-operator owners in management 
decisions and subsidized crop revenue insurance as a risk management program. The model 




involvement of non-operator owners in management decisions and lower adoption rates for land 
retirement programs and structural practices with subsidized crop revenue insurance.  
Impacts of Conservation Practice Adoption on Water Quality 
The relationship between farmers’ decisions about adoption of conservation practices and 
water quality outcomes is part of a complex social-ecological system.  Farmers’ decisions about 
adopting conservation practices are inherently dynamic, affected by changes in environmental, 
economic, and social conditions, including interactions with other farmers.  Water quality 
models used to assess agricultural policy interventions, such as the SWAT, lack the dynamic 
social component of farmer’s decisions. Therefore, the framework introduced in Chapter 4 
combines and synthesizes previously developed SWAT model in Chapter 2 and the farmer 
typology and ABM in Chapter 3. This framework provides a powerful and novel tool to explore 
the impacts of the plausible future scenarios such as changes in the land tenure and policy on 
land management strategies.  
The focus of this framework is to analyze how water quality is affected in future plausible 
scenarios for conservation practices at the farm scale of the Sandusky watershed. Four plausible 
future scenarios are investigated, which focus on the involvement of owners in the decision-
making of the farm and subsidized crop revenue insurance as a risk management program. The 
investigation of plausible scenarios reveals the significance of non-operator owners and their 
potential impact on the agricultural landscape and consequently on water quality. The highest 
nutrient and sediment reduction is achieved when non-operator owners had active role in 
conservation decisions. On the contrary, model results indicate a possible increase in nutrient and 
sediment loads with the subsidized crop revenue insurance, in the absence of conservation 




decrease in land retirement program enrollment and structural practice adoption, leading to a 
homogenous conservation landscape. The linked model results underline the importance of 
conservation compliance which discourages farmers from farming highly erodible land and 
draining wetlands.  
Future Work  
This framework is novel and powerful in modeling the social-ecological system of farmer 
decision-making and consequent water quality impacts of conservation practices in a 
predominantly agricultural watershed, the Sandusky watershed OH. Because of data limitation, 
the ABM is a stylized representation of the watershed; it will be a worthy area for future work to 
implement a similar framework with empirical field data collected with decision makers.  
In this framework water quality impacts are retroactively modeled, because in Chapter 2, 
SWAT model was calibrated and validated for 1970-2010. In future work, a valuable test would 
be to implement this framework in prospective modeling with the inclusion of possible climate 
change scenarios. The use of future climate projections could possibly increase the uncertainty in 
the linked model results but still be informative for adaptation efforts.  
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Appendix A: Model parameters for the agent-based model of 
farmer adoption of conservation practices 
 
The following sections present the model used in this study following the ODD (Overview, 
Design concepts and Details) protocol (Grimm et al. 2006; Grimm et al., 2010). 
Purpose 
This model is designed to investigate the impact of alternative policy approaches and 
changing land tenure dynamics on farmer adoption of conservation practices intended to increase 
the water quality.  
State variables and scales 
The modeled environment consists of a two-dimensional grid space representing the abstract 
agricultural landscape of the Sandusky watershed. The ABM is coupled with a water quality 
model; therefore the specifics of the water quality model are taken into consideration during the 
setup phase of the ABM. For a better match with the water quality model, there are 351 farmers 
in the ABM. The model is run for annual steps of 41 years (1970-2010).  
In the model, every farmer owns a farm and each has utility functions with bounded 
rationality. The farmers specialize in cash-crops such as corn, soybean or winter wheat. They 
have cash earnings from crop production or from enrollment in government programs. The 




farmers also maintain network connections to other farmers and government agencies with 
varying strengths.  In most ABMs, agents are defined by their spatial location (Brown et al. 
2005); however, in this model the farmer agents do not change their location as time progresses. 
A farmer’s location on the grid determines the spatial neighbors of that farmer. Some of the 
farmer attributes do not change during the simulations, such as the percentage of income derived 
from farming and connectedness to the network. However, as farmers age in every simulation 
run, some of them change their types. For example, after age 65 some of the traditional farmers 
leave the farming business and switch to be non-operator owners, or sell/rent their land to 
business-oriented or supplementary farmers. We assume supplementary and business-oriented 
farmers to not change their types as they age. Figure A-1 shows the class diagram of the model. 
 
Figure A-1: Class diagram of the ABM model 
Process overview and scheduling 
The diagram in Figure A-2 gives the process overview and scheduling of the model. For each 
simulation, farmers annually update their adoption decisions under the influence of agricultural 




agent loop is equally important as the landscape update, which is the key mechanism that affects 
the water quality component of the coupled system (Figure A-2).  
During the simulation phase, each farmer agent is provided with a behavioral model that 
guides the decision-making process. With the behavioral model and farmer attributes, the farmer 
agents decide whether to adopt a specific conservation practice or not. The results from the 
farmer agent decision update the management landscape. 
 
Figure A-2: Process overview and scheduling for a model run. 
The decision-making algorithm consists of inputs from profit generated from the agricultural 




depending on farmer type, and sometimes information from their spatial neighbors and other 
farmers in their social network. Every agent in the model uses the same decision algorithm with 
different parameters due to the heterogeneity of agents’ preferences. Depending on their tenure 
arrangements, decision makers could either be the owner or the tenant. Because of this 
flexibility, this model is also used to investigate the possible impact of growing proportions of 
farmland owned by non-operator owners and their influence on conservation decisions.  
Design Concepts 
• Emergence: The agricultural landscape of conservation practices emerge from the 
individual decisions of farmers which are informed by their economic activities, social 
and spatial networks, preferences, and policies that they follow. 
• Adaptation: Farmers adapt and update their decisions depending on price and yield 
expectations for future years. Depending on their types, farmers have differing network 
connectivity which influences their conservation decisions. Farmers update their 
conservation practice adoption decisions by interacting and observing other farmers and 
due to changes in the agri-environmental policies and markets.  
• Prediction: Farmers have expectations for future yields, crop prices, and rental rates 
offered for land retirement programs by using the historic information. Farmers use these 
forecasts for their adoption decisions every year. 
• Sensing: Farmers know their production yields every year and their profit from that 
year’s production. Farmers also know whether their neighbors, both in their spatial and 
social networks, adopted a practice. 
• Interaction: Farmers interact to exchange information on adoption of conservation 




• Stochasticity: The model has stochasticity built in several ways. Conservation practice 
selection decision is stochastic, as the farmers are most likely to select the highest ranked 
practice. However, as the farmers are not modeled as purely rational decision makers, the 
highest ranking conservation practice is not always chosen. Moreover, to better represent 
the decision environment, the submodels also have stochastic parameters to represent the 
uncertainty and variability observed in nature. By using the agent decision-making 
algorithm over the model run of 41 years, each agent has a sequence of conservation 
practices adopted and resultant landscape changes. 
• Collectives: Farmers are connected in two ways. In the spatial networks, farmers are 
connected to their immediate spatial neighbors. In social networks, farmers are connected 
to other farmers with varying strengths and connectivity. Network connections allow 
farmers to observe whether other farmers in their network have adopted a conservation 
practice.  
• Observation: The model produces the conservation adoption patterns at the end of each 
simulation.  
• Learning: Bayesian inference used for updating price and yield expectations of farmers 
is a form of learning.  
Initialization 
At the beginning of each model simulation, 351 farmers are created to represent the total of 
approximately 7500 farmers in the Sandusky watershed. Because the ABM is linked to SWAT, 
properties of SWAT are decisive. In SWAT, there are 351 agricultural hydrologic response units 




agent characteristics are given in Table A-1. The farmer typology built in Chapter 3 informs the 
farmer preferences for conservation practices typologically.  
The agricultural structure of the study area is defined by the number of farmers and their 
production areas. The parameters defining each farmer such as age, ownership of the land, 
percentage of income generated by agricultural activity, and land tenure arrangements are 
assigned from a normal distribution within a range that is informed by regional statistics 
provided by National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). Then, each farmer agent is 
associated with its appropriate type (Table A-2). 
 
Property Meaning The Model  
Reactive Responds to changes in the environment Yes 
Autonomous  Have control over its own actions Yes 
Temporally continuous Continuous agent behavior Yes 
Communicative Communicates with other agents Yes 
Mobile Changes location from one to another No 
Flexible/Learning Actions are not scripted, can change Yes 
Character Believable personality with emotions No 
Interactive physically Decisions affect other agents Yes 
Interactive socially Decisions affect other agents Yes 
Goal oriented Responsive to the environment Yes 























Farm Size Small Small Medium to Large N/A 
Primary Source of 











Table A-2: Farmer types constructed by using policy-relevant farmer characteristics. 
Input 
In every simulation run, the model reflects changes in the political and economic 
environment such as changes in agricultural policy and crop prices.  
Submodels 
Farmers are autonomous decision makers regarding conservation practice adoption. Below 
are the sub-model explanations that control farmers’ adoption decisions. The algorithm includes 
subcomponents that model the profitability of the farm business, influence of farmer preferences, 
and connectedness of the farmers, both socially and spatially. A special attention is given to 
agricultural profit calculations and the social connectedness of the agents, as they play significant 
roles in agents’ decision-making.  
At each time step, which can be interpreted as a year, every farmer makes decisions 
regarding conservation practice adoption. Farmers can choose to adopt none or a combination of 
the practices. The practices available to farmers tackle the non-point source pollution by 
controlling the pollution source (nutrient management), trapping the soil particles before they 




covers (land retirement, CRP), and reducing soil disturbance (non-structural practices, i.e., 
conservation tillage and no-till systems) (Table A-3).  
Farmers’ adoption decisions have temporal consequences. That is, if a farmer enrolls in land 
retirement programs and signs a CRP contract, the commitment is a multi-year commitment, 
where in case of contract breach a penalty has to be paid. Similarly, adoption of structural 
practices such as filter strips requires a multi-year commitment as well because farmers receive 
economic incentives from the government. Adoption decisions of non-structural practices and 
nutrient management plans, however, are made on a yearly basis, and do not entail a penalty. In 
this model, we assume every farmer to be eligible for land retirement enrollment and every 
farmer who adopts structural practices to be eligible for 50% cost share incentive provided by the 
government. 
Adoption of structural and non-structural practices, land retirement enrollment, and 
participation in nutrient management plans are voluntary decisions.  Each farmer determines 
whether to enroll in land retirement programs (such as Conservation Reserve Program, CRP), to 
adopt certain conservation practices, or choose not to adopt any practice, depending on their 
farm’s overall objective. The overall objective is a combination of multiple objectives that 
include the profitability of the business, attitudes towards different conservation practices 
depending on farmer type, and influences of the spatial and social network. These objectives, 
each represented by a specific function, are combined in a single function that represents the 
overall utility of the farmer (Equation A.1).  
Every period, the overall utility to a farmer for every conservation practice adoption option 




conservation practices) is calculated. The list of conservation practices and their combinations 
are given in Table A-3.   
i Conservation practice 
0 None 
1 Non-structural practices (no-till) 
2 Structural practices (filter strips) 
3 Land retirement programs (Conservation Reserve Program, CRP) 
4 Nutrient management plans 
5 Non-structural practices (no-till) & Structural practices (filter strips) 
6 Non-structural practices (no-till) &  Nutrient management plans 
7 Structural practices (filter strips) & Nutrient management plans 
8 Non-structural practices (no-till) & Structural practices (filter strips) 
& Nutrient management plans 
Table A-3: Available conservation practices and their combinations to farmers. 
The decision algorithm combines all of the available information to the farmer and integrates 
for the adoption decision. This mechanism includes the profit generated from agricultural 
production, availability of government programs and policies, influence of the farmers’ 
neighbors and farmers’ intrinsic attributes. These are all combined within a utility function, 
Fdecide(i) for the conservation practice combination i and farmer j, which is a combination of 4 
sub-functions (Equation A.1).  
Once the farmer calculates utility of each conservation practice, the values of utility are 
transformed into choice probability using logit model. Logit framework allows us to incorporate 
both uncertainty in decision-making and the bounded rationality of the farmers as it assigns 
probabilities to different options, where the probability of an inferior option could be non-zero 
(Equation A.2). 




Selection_probability (i,j) = e Fdecide(i,j) / Σe Fdecide(i,j)      (A.2) 
In every period, for every farmer (j), Fdecide(i,j) is calculated for all possible combinations of 
the conservation practices (i). In this function Fecon(i,j) represents the agricultural profit generated 
with production, Fprofile(i,j), the intrinsic attributes of the farmer towards the given conservation 
practice combination, which is determined by its type, Fsocial(i,j), the influence of the farmer’s 
social network and Fspatial(i,j), the influence of the spatial network, i.e. the farmer’s neighbors. 
Fsocial(i,j) and Fspatial(i,j) are also influenced by the farmer typology. The weights (β) for each 
component are informed by the farmer typology and determined using a matrix method 
(Appendix B). One of the important modeling choices that incorporate the differences between 
the different farmer types is the assignment of the weights (β). These weights are assigned in 
such a way that the farmer types whose income source is solely farming, and the types with 
profit maximizing mindset (i.e., business-oriented farmers) put more emphasis to Fecon(i,j), while 
farmers with more connection to the landscape (i.e., traditional farmers) put more emphasis on 
Fprofile(i,j). Because non-operators do not live in the county in which they own land, or they do 
not have a farming background, they are not connected to the information networks have no b 
values for Fspatial and Fsocial.  More details on each component of the Fdecide(i,j) function is given in 
subsequent sections. 
1. Agricultural Profit Dynamics, Fecon(i,j) 
Farmers generate revenue by enrolling in land retirement programs and allocating land to the 
CRP or by crop production. If the farmer enrolls in land retirement programs, a fixed payment 
depending on the farm size and CRP rental rate is paid at the beginning of each year the farmer 
allocates land for retirement programs. There will be no further agricultural revenue generated 




the farmer’s expected earning is calculated using the farm size, the price and yield of the crop 
that the farmer expects to get, governmental support for enrolling agricultural programs, and 
costs associated with production and conservation practice adoption. Single period profit 
function of a farmer producing a single crop is written below in two forms representing policy 
scenarios of crop revenue insurance and without crop revenue insurance. In our models, the 
commodity payments such as direct payments are not represented explicitly.  
Fecon(i,j)= p(A-F)Y (z) + gF + rA – c        (A.3) 
without crop revenue insurance program   
Fecon(i,j)= p(A-F)Y (λ, z) + gF + rA – c – π(λ)      (A.4) 
with crop revenue insurance program 
where Fecon(i,j) is profit, p is farmer’s expected crop price (corn, soybean or winter wheat), A 
is the production area (acres), Y is the farm's expected effective yield per acre, g denotes per acre 
economic incentive associated with structural practice adoption, F is total land allocated for 
structural practices, r is the CRP per acre payment to the farmer, z is a measure of fertilizer input 
on the farm, c is the total cost of production including cost of conservation practice adoption, π is 
the per acre premium rate for crop revenue insurance, and λ is the level of insurance purchased. 
In this model we assume 75% coverage level for revenue insurance. 
Agricultural crop production generates revenue (market price multiplied by production size 
and expected yield). Agricultural profit dynamics also include government payments (such as 
payments to incentivize structural practice adoption), insurance indemnities if enrolled in crop 
revenue insurance program, and cost production including maintenance, input, and labor costs as 




Ohio and Iowa State Universities is adopted and adjusted to previous years using historic 
consumer price index. 
Practices that farmers adopt influence the size of the production area and expected yield; 
therefore they affect the expected agricultural profit. For example, when a farmer implements 
structural practices, the size of the filter strip is subtracted from the total size of the farm. 
Moreover, with nutrient management plans the expected yield decreases. Therefore, Fecon value 
for each conservation practice available in Table A-3 is calculated separately.  
Expected Price and Yield: Expected prices and yield values heavily influence the resulting 
farm profit. These parameters are based on previous year’s price and yield values and updated by 
each farmer influenced by their farmer type.  
In the model, for actual crop yields and prices historical values are used (available at 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu and http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu). In any given time, based 
on the actual previous crop yields and prices, farmers use Bayesian inference to form price and 
yield expectations. While a farmer’s yield expectation is in the form of a point prediction, a 
probability distribution is formed for crop prices by taking the price expectation as the mean. 
Bayesian inference is a statistical approach used to update farmer’s existing expectations against 
observed values of crop price and yield. The Bayesian inference allows farmers to be connected 
to agricultural markets and at the same time ‘learn’ with experience. Moreover, with Bayesian 
inference, we can represent the heterogeneity of farmers by setting different parameters for 
updating their priors for crop prices and yields depending on the farmer type. For example, 
traditional farmers are more anchored so that realization of outliers do not affect their 
expectations much while business-oriented farmers are better at following the fluctuations in the 




Bayesian inference algorithm is implemented every year, hence farmers’ perceptions for crop 
prices and yields change annually.  At the beginning of each year, farmers use publicly available 
price and yield information from the previous year, their experiences and personalities to form 
future price and yield expectations.  
2. Intrinsic typology attributes, Fprofile (i,j) 
Farmer typology developed in Chapter 3 informs Fprofile values for each farmer type and 
conservation practice. F profile (i,j) lets farmers to adopt economically infeasible practices because 
of their attitudes and preferences such as being a good citizen of the environment (Table A-4). 
The synthesis of the adoption literature supports the F profile values, which change for every 
practice and every farmer type. In other words, F profile is the variable representing the socio-
economic attributes of the agents including the source of income, impact of farm size and land 















Farmer Type Land Management Attitudes 
Traditional 
- favor non-structural practices because of potential 
reduction in labor requirements  high F profile 
values 
- financial investment requirement leads to lower 
adoption rates for structural practices  low F profile 
values 
- secure income provided by land retirement 
programs is appealing  high F profile values 
Supplementary 
- favor non-structural practices because of potential 
reduction in labor requirements  high F profile 
values 
- substantial off-farm income leads to higher 
adoption rates for structural practices  high F 
profile values 
- secure income provided by land retirement 
programs is appealing  high F profile values 
Business-oriented 
- favor non-structural practices because of potential 
reduction in labor requirements  high F profile 
values 
- long-term plans and dependence on soil quality 
leads to higher structural practice adoption  high 
F profile values 
- focused on profitability, leading to low 
enrollment rates in land retirement programs  
low F profile values 
Non-operator owner 
Absentee landowners: own the land 
but do not reside on or operate it 
(Petrzelka et al., 2011)  
Investors: describe themselves as 
never having farmed (Nassauer et 
al., 2011). 
 Mutually exclusive subtypes. 
- favor non-structural and structural practices 
because of potential contribution to increased water 
quality   high F profile values 
- absentee landowners favor land retirement 
programs  high F profile values 
- investors have lower enrollment rates for land 
retirement programs   low F profile values 
 
Table A-4: Farmer typology and its influence on F profile values 
The F profile value for each farmer type and conservation practice is determined using 
prioritization matrix method and the synthesis of the adoption literature (Table A-4, Chapter 3). 




items into an order of importance. It also enables their relative importance to be identified 

















0 0.90 0.36 0.28 0.00 0.00 
1 0.68 0.49 0.74 1.00 1.00 
2 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.37 0.60 
3 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.48 0.17 
4 0.43 0.17 0.43 0.13 0.12 
5 0.10 0.22 0.36 0.55 0.72 
6 0.51 0.17 1.00 0.30 0.31 
7 0.08 0.17 0.28 0.55 0.62 
8 0.07 0 0.31 0.86 0.63 
Table A-5: F profile values  
3. Social and spatial network, Fsocial(i,j) and Fspatial(i,j) 
To represent interactions between agents, there are several artificial social network structures 
such as lattice, small-world, scale-free and random networks. As little to no data is available for 
the historical and current social network structure of the farmers we chose to rely on artificial 
network structures. After a comparison of widely used social network structures, Hamill and 
Gilbert (2009) suggest a simple but at the same time sociologically realistic network structure.  
To represent the varying network connectedness of agents displayed in the farmer typology, the 
social network suggested by Hamill and Gilbert (2009) is suitable.  
Hamill and Gilbert (2009) base their network structure on the analogy of social circles.  In 
the social network, agents are permitted to have links with other agents who can reciprocate. The 
agent population is divided into two circles with small and large social reaches. Hamill and 




rest of the population by placing them in the social circle that has larger social reach. When the 
social reach is larger, the size of the personal network would be larger as well. In our model, 
business-oriented agents are located in a social circle that has larger social reach than 
supplementary and traditional farmer agents which results in increased number of connections 
for business-oriented farmers (Chapter 3). Hamill and Gilbert’s (2009) network structure also 
allows us to connect business-oriented farmers more to other business-oriented farmers. Non-
operator owners (investors and absentee landowners) are initially not connected to the social 
network. However, to demonstrate the potential impacts of information networks on non-
operator owner decision, we simulate a scenario that assumes absentee landowners connect to the 
social network whereas investors connect to both spatial and social networks as they live close to 
the farmland that they own. Through the information networks (spatial and social networks), 
farmers observe their neighbors’ adoption decisions.   
Both Fspatial(i,j) and Fsocial(i,j) are calculated for every farmer for every possible conservation 
practice given in Table A-2.  Fspatial represents the percentage of Moore neighbors (the eight cells 
surrounding a central cell on a two-dimensional square lattice) adopting a certain conservation 
practice. Moore neighbors of a farmer comprise the immediate eight spatial neighbors that every 
farmer has, except the farmers on the edge if two-dimension grid space.  
Fspatial (i,j) = Neighbors(i,j) /  ΣNeighbors(i,j)     (A.5) 
where Neighbors(i) is the number of Moore neighbors that adopted the conservation practice 
combination i. That is, Fspatial (i) is a measure of popularity of conservation practice combination 
i in the immediate neighborhood of the given farmer. Higher the popularity of a conservation 




Fsocial represents the percentage of neighbors adopting a certain conservation practice. 
Similarly, Fsocial is calculated for every possible conservation practice listed in Table A-3. 
Connectedness in the social network is not uniform among the farmers. The number of 
connections of a farmer depends on its type. Moreover, among the farmers of a given type, the 
number of connections may differ, representing the heterogeneity of the farmers within the same 
type. However, the variation in the number of connections among the farmers of the same type is 
smaller than the variation between farmers of different types. For example, business-oriented 
farmers have higher number of social connections than the other farmers on average, while the 
connections of the business-oriented farmers are mostly to other business-oriented farmers.  
Traditional and supplementary farmers have lower number of connections. In a similar manner 
as F spatial (i,j), Fsocial (i,j) measures the popularity of the conservation practice combination i 
among the parts of the social network that are connected to the given farmer. Fsocial (i,j) can be 
written as follows: 
Fsocial (i,j) =  Network (i,j) / ΣNetwork (i,j)     (A.6) 
where Network(i,j) is the number of farmers that selected the conservation practice adoption i 
within the farmer j’s social network.          
Non-operator owners (investors and absentee landowners) are not initially connected to 
spatial and social networks. Therefore, initially they have no influence of information networks 
on their conservation adoption decisions. When increased involvement of non-operator owners in 
decision-making is simulated in Chapters 3 and 4, absentee-landowners are only connected to the 
social network and investors are connected to both spatial and social networks. For non-operator 
owners, social networks are assumed to be NGOs and government agencies leading to a positive 





i, conservation practices 
Investor Absentee landowner 
Fsocial Fspatial Fsocial 
0, none 0 0 0 
1, non-structural 1 0 1 
2, structural 1 0 1 
3, land retirement 1 0 1 
4, nutrient mgt plans 1 0 1 
5, non-structural & structural 1 0 1 
6, non-structural & nutrient mgt 1 0 1 
7, structural & nutrient mgt 1 0 1 
Table A-6: When non-operator owners (investors and absentee-landowners) have active roles in 
conservation decisions, they are connected to the information networks. Fspatial values for investors are 
calculated using Equation A.5 
Policy Scenarios 
We simulated four scenarios intended to form a bridge between the science of land 
management and policy development (Table A-7). The primary goal of these plausible policy 
scenarios is to be prospective and informative rather than projective or prescriptive of the future 
(Nassauer and Corry, 2004).  





















 NO YES 
NO 1 Baseline  
Simplified representation of 
existing land tenure and 
policy context 
2 Non-operator owners involvement 
Increased non-operator involvement in 
land management decisions 
YES 3 Crop revenue insurance 
Only operators are decision 
makers and crop revenue 
insurance is available as a 
risk management tool 
Available to all operators as 
a risk management tool  
4 Crop revenue insurance with non-
operator owner involvement 
Both operators and non-operators owners 
are decision makers and crop revenue 
insurance is available as a risk 
management tool 





The Baseline scenario (1) represents a simplified version of existing land tenure where operators 
(traditional, supplementary and business-oriented farmers) are responsible for conservation 
practice adoption decisions and non-operator owners have no involvement in production and 
conservation decisions. In this scenario existing crop insurance programs are not represented and 
crop revenue insurance is not offered in lieu of commodity payments.   
The Non-operator owner involvement scenario (2) simulates the potential impact of non-operator 
owners being more involved in decisions about conservation practice adoption. This premise 
follows recent research that demonstrated positive attitudes of non-operator owners for certain 
conservation practices (Petrzelka et al., 2009; Nassauer et al., 2011). In this scenario, we assume 
natural resource agencies and NGOs reach out to non-operator owners and effectively inform 
them about existing and available conservation practices.  
The Crop revenue insurance scenario (3) follows the latest US Farm Bill discussions about 
providing federally subsidized crop revenue insurance rather than commodity production 
subsidies. This scenario does not assume that conservation compliance is required for land to be 
eligible for crop revenue insurance. In this scenario, only operators are decision makers and they 
purchase crop revenue insurance at 75% coverage level for all the land that they manage 
including the rented land. Crop revenue insurance provides an accessible risk management tool 
to operators and at the same time encourages an increased production area. 
The Crop revenue insurance with non-operator owner involvement scenario (4) presents the 
plausible changes both in land tenure and policy by assuming non-operators owners as active 
decision makers when crop revenue insurance is offered in lieu of commodity payments. Crop 
revenue insurance provides a safety net and indirectly motivates both operators and non-operator 




Certain model parameters are changed depending on the policy scenario being investigated. 
Appendix B has initial model parameter values and how we change these values for different 
scenarios.  
Verification and Validation 
ABMs are informative rather than predictive and useful in investigating plausible scenarios 
and their potential consequences. Model verification and validation are important steps that 
contribute to the validity of the developed ABM. Model verification is the process of 
determining whether the software implementation correctly represent model processes (Ormerod 
and Rosewell, 2009).  As the ABMs are powerful in illustrating the phenomena of emergence, it 
is particularly difficult to determine whether an unexpected result is due to an error in the model 
implementation and execution (Galan et al., 2009). Therefore the verification stage of the model 
is particularly important. For the verification of the model, where the general aim is to make sure 
that the model does not have programming errors, we built the model in several levels with 
increasing complexity following unit testing approach (Linck and Frohlick, 2003) (Figure A-3). 
The unit testing approach suggests writing some test code to exercise the program 
simultaneously writing the complete model code. The purpose is to construct the model in small, 





Figure A-3: Levels of ABM as a verification tool 
 Model validation is the process of assessing the degree of which the model is accurately 




is populated using the farmer typology described in Chapter 3. For the farmer typology we 
synthesized the literature of conservation practice adoption. Therefore, for model validation we 
used the documented trends in the Corn Belt. Synthesis of numerous studies conducted in the 
Corn Belt provides spatially and temporally generalizable trends to compare and validate model 
results. Comparison of documented adoption rates for non-structural practices (CTIC, 2012) and 
enrollment rates for land retirement programs such as CRP (USDA, 2013)are within the 
simulated adoption rates 9Figures A-4 and A-5). For structural practices, we refer to empirical 
studies conducted in Ohio, which indicate 20-25% adoption rates similar to ABM results (Napier 
et al., 2000; Napier and Bridges, 2003).  
 
Figure A-4: Observed and simulated enrollment rates for land retirement programs such as 
Conservation Reserve Program, CRP in Sandusky watershed, OH (USDA, 2013). 25 ABM simulation runs 





Figure A-5: Observed and simulated adoption rates for non-structural practices such as conservation 
tillage and no-till in Sandusky watershed, OH (CTIC, 2012). 25 ABM simulation runs fall between two lines 
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Appendix B: Model parameters for the agent-based model of 




























Name Parameter description Value 
percentBus percentage of business-oriented farmers 0.1 
percentSuppl percentage of supplementary farmers 0.2 
percentTrad percentage of traditional farmers 0.7 
initialAdopted0 
percentage of farmers that adopted none of 
the practices 0.8 
initialAdopted1 
percentage of farmers that adopted non-
structural practices 0.0 
initialAdopted2 
percentage of farmers that adopted 
structural practices 0.1 
initialAdopted3 
percentage of farmers that enrolled in land 
retirement programs 0.0 
initialAdopted4 
percentage of farmers that adopted nutrient 
management plan 0.1 
initialAdopted5 
percentage of farmers that adopted non-
structural and structural practices 0.0 
initialAdopted6 
percentage of farmers that adopted non-
structural practices and nutrient 
management plan 0.0 
initialAdopted7 
percentage of farmers that adopted 
structural practices and nutrient 
management plan 0.0 
ownerInterference 
percentage of non-operator owners  initially 
giving decisions 0.0 
ownerMaxInterference 
percentage of non-operator owners giving 
decisions at the end of the simulation 0.8 
farmerAgeToLeave 
age at which traditional farmers consider 
leaving business 65 
farmerProbToLeave 
probability that traditional farmers leave 
business 0.8 
farmerProbNonoperator 
probability that traditional farmers leaving 
the business become non-operator owners 0.6 
farmerProbAbsentee 
probability that traditional farmers leaving 
the business become absentee landowners.  0.6 
ciLevel level of crop revenue insurance coverage 0.8 
simpleCiPlusMinusBus 
level of business farmers' uncertainty about 
their price expectation 0.3 
simpleCiPlusMinusTrad 
level of traditional farmers' uncertainty about 
their price expectation 0.4 
simpleCiPlusMinusSupp 
level of supplementary farmers' uncertainty 
about their price expectation 0.3 



















weight of agricultural profit on 
decision algorithm 0.34 0.30 
β2 
weight of farmer profile on decision 
algorithm 0.40 0.52 
β3 
weight of social network on 
decision algorithm 0.09 0.05 
β4 
weight of spatial network on 
decision algorithm 0.17 0.13 
Supplementary 
β1 
weight of agricultural profit on 
decision algorithm 0.27 0.23 
β2 
weight of farmer profile on decision 
algorithm 0.46 0.58 
β3 
weight of social network on 
decision algorithm 0.17 0.13 
β4 
weight of spatial network on 




weight of agricultural profit on 
decision algorithm 0.49 0.45 
β2 
weight of farmer profile on decision 
algorithm 0.19 0.31 
β3 
weight of social network on 
decision algorithm 0.24 0.20 
β4 
weight of spatial network on 




weight of agricultural profit on 
decision algorithm 0.09 0.05 
β2 
weight of farmer profile on decision 
algorithm 0.61 0.69 
β3 
weight of social network on 
decision algorithm 0.30 0.26 
β4 
weight of spatial network on 
decision algorithm 0.00 0.00 
Investor β1 
weight of agricultural profit on 
decision algorithm 0.08 0.04 






weight of social network on 
decision algorithm 0.29 0.25 
β4 
weight of spatial network on 
decision algorithm 0.18 0.14 
Traditional 
Fprofile0 
farmer attributes for adopting none 
of the practices 0.90 1.00 
Fprofile1 
farmer attributes for adopting non-
structural practices 0.68 0.96 
Fprofile2 
farmer attributes for adopting 
structural practices 0.00 0.02 
Fprofile3 
farmer attributes for adopting land 
retirement programs 1.00 0.00 
Fprofile4 
farmer attributes for adopting 
nutrient management plans 0.43 0.35 
Fprofile5 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural and structural 
practices 0.10 0.10 
Fprofile6 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural practices and 
nutrient management plans 0.51 0.42 
Fprofile7 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
structural practices and nutrient 
management plans 0.08 0.07 
Supplementary 
Fprofile0 
farmer attributes for adopting none 
of the practices 0.36 0.48 
Fprofile1 
farmer attributes for adopting non-
structural practices 0.49 1.00 
Fprofile2 
farmer attributes for adopting 
structural practices 0.06 0.08 
Fprofile3 
farmer attributes for adopting land 
retirement programs 1.00 0.00 
Fprofile4 
farmer attributes for adopting 
nutrient management plans 0.17 0.77 
Fprofile5 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural and structural 
practices 0.22 0.06 
Fprofile6 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural practices and 





farmer attributes for adopting both 
structural practices and nutrient 




farmer attributes for adopting none 
of the practices 0.28 0.50 
Fprofile1 
farmer attributes for adopting non-
structural practices 0.74 0.65 
Fprofile2 
farmer attributes for adopting 
structural practices 0.20 0.03 
Fprofile3 
farmer attributes for adopting land 
retirement programs 0.00 0.00 
Fprofile4 
farmer attributes for adopting 
nutrient management plans 0.43 1.00 
Fprofile5 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural and structural 
practices 0.36 0.08 
Fprofile6 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural practices and 
nutrient management plans 1.00 0.66 
Fprofile7 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
structural practices and nutrient 




farmer attributes for adopting none 
of the practices 0.00 0.38 
Fprofile1 
farmer attributes for adopting non-
structural practices 1.00 0.74 
Fprofile2 
farmer attributes for adopting 
structural practices 0.60 0.02 
Fprofile3 
farmer attributes for adopting land 
retirement programs 0.17 0.00 
Fprofile4 
farmer attributes for adopting 
nutrient management plans 0.12 0.49 
Fprofile5 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural and structural 
practices 0.72 0.03 
Fprofile6 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural practices and 
nutrient management plans 0.31 1.00 
Fprofile7 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
structural practices and nutrient 






farmer attributes for adopting none 
of the practices 0.00 0.38 
Fprofile1 
farmer attributes for adopting non-
structural practices 1.00 0.74 
Fprofile2 
farmer attributes for adopting 
structural practices 0.37 0.02 
Fprofile3 
farmer attributes for adopting land 
retirement programs 0.48 0.00 
Fprofile4 
farmer attributes for adopting 
nutrient management plans 0.13 0.49 
Fprofile5 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural and structural 
practices 0.55 0.03 
Fprofile6 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
non-structural practices and 
nutrient management plans 0.30 1.00 
Fprofile7 
farmer attributes for adopting both 
structural practices and nutrient 
management plans 0.55 0.02 
     
Table B-2: Model parameters comparison for crop revenue insurance scenario. 
 
